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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The dissertation aims to study the effects of government debt on the solvency 
risk, economic instability and the quality of banks’ loans in case of Vietnam by 
empirically testing the three main hypotheses following from the theoretical analysis: 
1) An increase in domestic borrowing causes Vietnam to be more prone 
to external shocks (as measured by CDS spreads). 
2) Greater reliance on domestic debt as compared to external borrowing 
leads to a higher economic instability in Vietnam. 
3) Higher the country’s overall public debt is associated with higher 
level of non-performing loans in local banks.                     
The economy of Vietnam is now under severe pressure and threatened by 
aggressive level of risk related to large public debt - driven mainly by the expansion of 
domestic borrowing, serious fiscal challenges, inflation uncertainty and huge amount of 
bank’s non-performing loans. This has made it paramount to empirically investigate the 
relationship and impact between government debt, country credit risk, inflation and 
bank’s non-performing loans so that the policy makers will be well informed in 
identifying and framing the problems of both macroeconomic conditions and financial 
market and then can effectively make decision on both fiscal and monetary policy. In 
addition to that, the government of Vietnam has been also warned, without empirical 
evidence, that high public debt and in more specific, greater reliance on domestic debt 
with higher interest rate and shorter maturity can be a serious obstacle to fiscal 
improvement, development performance and economic growth of Vietnam. 
So far, there has been no empirical evidence on the effects of domestic debt on 
both financial and macroeconomic conditions in the context of Vietnam. Much of the 
existing studies have focused mainly on external debt in the context of industrialized 
countries, while the issue of internal debt has received less attention. This study, hence, 
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contributes to the existing literature by empirically testing the impact of government 
debt; with specific concentrate on the domestic debt effects, on Vietnam’s economic 
performance in general and on banking market risk in particular, using different 
economic models such as Autoregressive Distributed Lag Modeling, Vector Error 
Correction Model and one-step System GMM estimation.  
This dissertation includes five chapters – the first chapter provides a general 
introduction of public debt situation in Vietnam, the next two chapters empirically 
examine the impact of government debt on macroeconomic variables, with particular 
concentration on domestic debt analysis due to its increasing contribution to the 
country’s overall public debt, fourth chapter will be more detail in accessing the effect 
of Vietnam’s public debt on banking market risk and final chapter will be the 
concluding remarks. Specifically: 
Chapter 1 is a brief introduction. For systematization purposes, the current issue 
of Vietnam’s public debt was analyzed and the potential impacts of increasing public 
debt on economic performance were also considered.  
Chapter 2 focuses on the macroeconomic determinants of sovereign credit risk 
in Vietnam from January 2005 to December 2014 by using Autoregressive Distributed 
Lag Modeling. The study finds the existence of both long run and short run 
relationships among variables and the global factors outperform macroeconomic factors 
in the short term. In long-term, the creditworthiness of the country is affected largely 
by macroeconomic fundamentals, specifically the international reserve, which 
represents the financial capacity of the country, domestic government debt and terms of 
trade volatility. The country’s output gap is found to causes the country to be more 
susceptible to the external shocks in long-term, although the scale of its impact is quite 
small given the fact that Vietnam increasingly depends on domestic borrowings to push 
economic growth, which results in higher volatility in the long run. 
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Based on the empirical result of Chapter 2, which shows that domestic 
borrowing adversely affect the creditworthiness of Vietnam in long run, making the 
country less attractive to international investors and thus be more prone to the volatility 
of the global market, leading to higher instability in the economy. In Chapter 3, we next 
examine how an increase in domestic borrowing (relative to external borrowing) to 
finance fiscal deficit influences the stability of the economy through its effect on the 
inflation based on quarterly data from March 2000 to December 2015 by applying a 
Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) with control variables of budget deficit, 
bank’s credit to private sector and lending interest rate. Granger causality test is also 
employed to examine the debt-inflation relationship. Furthermore, in order to address 
the effects of the shift in the composition of country’s public debt toward domestic debt 
on the stability of the economy, this chapter includes the ratio of domestic debt to 
external debt as a control variable instead of the ratio of domestic debt to GDP. The 
estimated results show that larger public deficit and higher domestic borrowing as 
compared to external debt cause inflation to increase in the future. Together with 
domestic debt and fiscal deficit, the growth rate of credit to the rest of the economy and 
bank’s lending rate also have a significant impact on inflation dynamics of Vietnam. 
This confirms that besides monetary financing, debt financing is also inflationary in 
long-term. The findings of this study also indicate the situation of fiscal dominance in 
case of Vietnam.     
Chapter 4 of this dissertation tries to empirically investigate relationship 
between the country’s overall public debt and credit risk of banking market (proxied by 
the level of Non-performing loans (NPLs)) in 32 Vietnamese banks over the period 
from 2004 to 2014 by using one-step System GMM estimators developed by Blundell 
and Bond (1998). Overall, the results indicate that macroeconomic factors (GDP 
growth rate, public debt, loans provided to and performance of State-owned 
Enterprises) play predominant role in the movement of NPLs in banks. Unlike previous 
 v 
studies, the study discovers that higher economic growth is correlated with lower 
current NPLs, but higher future NPLs. The shortened effect of growth on reducing 
NPLs suggests that in Vietnam, during the observed period, economic growth affects 
bank’s asset quality mainly through its effects on the volume of bank lending, rather 
than via its impact on improving borrower’s capacity to service their debts. In addition, 
the estimated results also reveal that large debt burden causes contemporaneous NPLs 
to decrease. This might because of the transfer of risky loans from balance sheet of 
banks to the government in form of sovereign debt.  
Finally Chapter 5 will review the key outcomes of the thesis and their policy 
implications, summarizes the limitations of the thesis as well as other issues for further 
studies. 
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CHAPTER 1 
                   INTRODUCTION 
1.1 RESEARCH PROBLEMS 
Understanding the effect of public debt on the economy remains central to 
studies of debt sustainability in developing countries. While the scholarly literature in 
this topic has focused mainly on external debt, the issue of internal debt has received 
less attention, although, as Christensen (2005) has noted, domestic borrowing has 
significant effect on macroeconomic stability, private sector credit and budget position 
in less developed countries. Similarly, by investigating the growth impact of domestic 
debt in 93 countries between 1975 and 2004, Abbas and Christensen (2007) has 
addressed that domestic debt can make an important contribution to macroeconomic 
stability and the vulnerability to internal and external monetary shocks. The importance 
of domestic borrowing is also examined in such research as those by Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2008), who study the link between domestic debt and sovereign default in 64 
economies from 1914 to 2007 and come to a conclusion that there is a “forgotten 
history of domestic debt”.  
In case of Vietnam, recent rapid accumulation of public debt, driven mainly by 
high and rising domestic debt to finance budget deficit, has become increasingly 
noticeable, with the level rising to an alarming 60% of GDP in 2014, of which domestic 
debt accounted for around 32% of GDP, while external debt amounted to 28% of GDP, 
based on the statistics from the World Bank. This ratio has almost reached the threshold 
level of 65% set by the government of Vietnam and far exceeded the safety level 
ranging from 40-45% as suggested by the IMF1. In addition, the average growth rate of 
Vietnam’s public debt has been recorded at 18% since 2011; far exceed the average 
GDP annual growth rate of 5.4% (calculation based on the data of World Bank) and in 
																																																								1	IMF Country Report Number 14/311, October 2014.	
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comparison with regional neighboring countries such as Thailand, Malaysia, Laos and 
Cambodia, Vietnam ranks the highest (Figure 1.1).  
Figure 1.1: Total Government Debt to GDP in 2014 (%) 
Source: World Bank 
However, it is believed that the official data on public debt does not accurately 
reflect the real situation of the country because of the difference in accounting methods. 
Specifically, Vietnam’s calculation of public debt does not comply with international 
practices since it includes only Government debt, Government-guaranteed debt, and 
local government debt, but exclude the debt held by State-owned Enterprises2. If the 
debt of State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) were accounted, the overall level of Vietnam’s 
public debt would be more than 100% of GDP in 20143.  
In fact, the quick expansion of Vietnam’s public debt is attributed mainly to 
large and persistent budget deficit resulting from both cyclical and structural reasons. 
As shown in Figure 1.2, from 2001 to 2014, Vietnam has posted an annual average 
budget deficit of 4.04% of GDP, reaching its all time high of 9.3 % of GDP in 2009 and 
																																																								
2 Article 1 of Chapter 1 of the Law on Public debt management No 29/2009/QH12 issued by the 
Vietnam National Assembly in June 17th 2009. 3	According to the government report, in 2014, 100 largest SOEs had borrowed a total of $ 68 billion, 
while the amount of national debt at that time was more than $116 billion. If the SOEs debt were 
included, the level of debt would reach more than $184 billion or more than 100% of GDP.	
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an estimated low of -1.3% of GDP in 2006. Also during the period of high budget 
deficit and large public debt from 2009 to 2014, the economy of Vietnam recorded an 
average GDP growth rate of 5.84% per annum, decreasing from 6.94% during the 
previous period between 2001 and 2008 (calculated based on data from the World 
Bank). It is, hence, undoubtedly that worsening fiscal position and increasing 
government debt have been the key reasons for the sluggish growth in Vietnam’s 
economy in recent year, posing serious problems for the government in achieving 
economic stability and prosperity.  However, the increasing trend of Vietnam’s public 
debt is likely to continue in the coming years as the government still relies strongly on 
borrowing to push economic growth and cover its excessive expenditures. Therefore, 
an important question confronting the policy markers now is how the government can 
manage the sustainability of their debts and still ensure economic growth or whether 
the country needs fiscal adjustments.  
Figure 1.2. Budget balance and Public debt in Vietnam (% of GDP) 
Source: World Bank 
The question is especially pertinent when the World Bank has warned that 
increasing dependence on public debt, particularly expensive domestic debt, to achieve 
economic growth can be a serious obstacle to fiscal improvement and development 
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performance for Vietnam (WorldBank, 2015)4. However, an effective policy response 
to the country’s debt problems is somewhat constrained by the lack of empirical 
evidence on the effects of government debt on financial market risk, economic stability 
and the solvency of the country.  So far, much of the existing literature on government 
debt has been conducted in the context of developed and emerging economies, while 
that in the context of Vietnam is still limited.  
1.2 THE SITUATION OF VIETNAM’S PUBLIC DEBT 
Initially, government public debt in Vietnam has emerged since the start of the 
reform from centrally planned economy to a market-oriented economy in 1986, with 
main objective was to achieve sustainable development and assure poverty reduction. 
Because of soft budget constraints during the centrally planned period, Vietnam had 
suffered from a shortage of capital and significant fiscal problems (Figure 1.3).  
Figure 1.3: Budget Balances from 1988 to 2000 
 Source: General Statistic Office 
 
Like all other developing economies, Vietnam	needs to borrow from both 
external sources, under the forms of concessionary loans and grants at the interest rates 																																																								
4 WorldBank (2015): Taking Stock – An Update on Vietnam’s Recent Economic 
Developments.  
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as low as 1 to 3 percent per annum, and internal sources to finance its deficits. Starting 
at just under 2 % in 1981, the ratio of external debt to GNI of Vietnam climbed up 
sharply to a peak of approximately 384 % in 1990 before declining to more than 100 % 
in 1997.  
In 1999, in response to the worsening debt’s indicators in HIPC countries 
including Vietnam, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund decided to 
endorse the HIPC debt relief initiative with the intention of improving debt situation 
and reducing poverty in these countries. As Vietnam was qualified for this initiative, 
about 9 billion USD of external debts of the country were cancelled, and resultantly, 
the ratio of external debt to GNI was drastically improved – to nearly 40 % in 2000 
(Figure 1.4). 
 Figure 1.4: External debt to GNI (percent) 
Source: IMF, ADB 
In addition to external sources of finance, the government has also acquired 
funds from the public domestically. In 1992 the government of Vietnam started 
borrowing from internal sources to offset deficits by issuing government bonds and 
treasury bills after an unsuccessful effort in the mid-1980s and a proportion of these 
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bills were subject to compulsory purchase by state-owned enterprises (Harvie and Tran, 
1997)5. However, the size of government domestic borrowings was relatively small in 
comparison to those of external sources and the government generally avoided 
financing its imbalances through the sale of bonds during 1990s.  
Until 2009, while almost 60 % of Vietnam’s public debt was external debt, 
domestic debt accounted for only less than a third of the country’s total debt. However, 
since 2009, the structure of the overall public debt of Vietnam has witnessed a major 
change, away from foreign-currency-denominated debts towards domestic debts, as a 
result of the moving in the group of middle-income countries. Between 2010 and 2014, 
the growth rate of external borrowing was about 76 %, while that of internal borrowing 
was more than 150 % (MOF, 2014). The significant expansion of domestic debt has 
contributed mainly to the considerable rise of the country’s overall public debt 
meanwhile access to foreign loans has decreased because of the gradual withdrawal of 
official creditors. At the end of 2014, the total internal debt increased in terms of GDP 
to 32 %, while the total external debt remained fairly stable at around 28 % of GDP, 
leading the total government public debt to 60% of GDP (Figure 1.5). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
5 Harvie, C. and Tran, V. H. (1997). Vietnam’s Reforms and Economic Growth. 
London : MacMillan Press Ltd.  
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Figure 1.5: Composition of public debt (debt to GDP ratio) 
 
                                                                                                 Source: World Bank 
 
This surge in domestic debt market has been led by both the growth in supply 
from the government and the increased demand from banks.  In the face of falling 
foreign funding (mostly in the form of concessional loans) and increasing budget 
deficits, the government of Vietnam has turned internal debt market through the sales 
of government bonds to meet its increasing financial needs. The annual reports 
prepared by The Hanoi Stock Exchange revealed that the issuance volume of 
government bonds totaled from 25 trillion VND in 2009 to more than 1,128 trillion 
VND in 2015, equivalent to 27% of GDP  (Figure 1.6).  
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Figure 1.6: Issuance Volume of Government Bond (billion VND) 
 
Source: Hanoi Stock Exchange 
 
On the demand side, local commercial banks are likely to raise their holding of 
government bonds given the weak balance sheets and economic downturn. In fact, in 
2010 the economy of Vietnam witnessed a slowdown in growth and a high-speed rise 
in bank’s bad debt ratio. As a result, commercial banks turned risk averse and preferred 
to invest in government debt, which allow them to put their money in a safer way as 
compared to lending, consequently the portion of total commercial banks’ assets 
allocated to government debt increased significantly. According to the statistics from 
the Hanoi Stock Exchange, 11 largest commercial banks invested VND 342,778 billion 
($ 15.6 billion) in government debts in 2013, equivalent to 11 % of their total assets (up 
from 7 % in 2007). The trading value of Government bonds on secondary market also 
went up sharply with an average annual increase of more than 115 % between 2011 and 
2014 (Figure 1.7). 
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Figure 1.7: Trading value of G-bonds on Secondary Market (trillion VND) 
 
Source: Hanoi Stock Exchange 
However, one of the main concerns about domestic borrowing is with its high 
interest rate and short maturity. Based on the data of Vietnam Bond Market 
Association6, by July 2016, the average interest rate of domestic debt is at around 
8.15 % per annum and maturity profile has been shortened gradually, with maturities of 
less than 5 years contributing to more than 80% of total domestic debt between 2011 
and 2014 (Figure 1.8). Increasing internal debt, therefore, has caused the debt financing 
costs to rise accordingly, adding more pressure for fiscal austerity and fiscal space for 
investment is subsequently further reduced. In 20147, interest payment on domestic 
debt as a percentage of government revenue was about 10.23%, while that on external 
debt was only 2.15% (Figure 1.9). Along with the rise in interest costs, the total debt 
service payments went up quickly to more than 35% of total budget revenue in 2014, 
up from 17.6% in 2010 (Figure 1.10) 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
6 Vietnam Bond Market Report- June 2016. Vietnam Bond Market Association 
7 MOF (2016): Public Debt Bulletin of Vietnam, Number 1 to Number 4 
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Figure 1.8: Domestic Debt Maturity Profile (as % of total) 
 
                                                                                 Source: Hanoi Stock Exchange 
 
 
Figure 1.9: Interest Payment to Revenue  
 
Source: Vietnam’s Ministry of Finance 
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Figure 1.10: Total Debt Service To Revenue 
 
      Source: Vietnam’s Ministry of Finance 
In addition to that, market for government domestic debt of Vietnam is 
characterized by narrow investor base, consisting mainly of insurance companies and 
commercial banks. At the end of 2014, out of total government outstanding debt, about 
85 % belonged to commercial banks, while 12 % belonged to domestic life insurance 
companies and the remaining of 3 % was held by investment funds, security and 
financial companies (Dragon Capital, 2015)8. The present of offshore investors in 
Vietnam domestic debt market is still limited, although there are no constraints on 
foreign holdings.  
1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
In order to fill the literature gap, this study aims to empirically determine the 
effect that the current situation of Vietnam’s public debt could have on the economy 
and their policy implications. Specifically, the second and third part of this study 
particularly concentrate on the impact of domestic debt in the form of local government 
																																																								
8 Dragon Capital (2015): Vietnam – a brief report from a frontier market, 2015 
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bond on the solvency risk of the country and the economic stability, while the 
remaining part focuses on public debt’s effects on the banking credit risk.  
To investigate the relationship between internal debts and country’s credit risk 
and which factors have determined the sovereign default risk, the prices of 5-year credit 
default swap are used as an indicator of default probability and a time-series dataset 
spanning the period from January 2005 to December 2014 is analyzed.  Beside the 
country-specific variables, this part also includes global variables to study the main 
determinants of Vietnam’s sovereign credit risk by using Autoregressive Distributed 
Lag Modeling (ARDL). The outcome of this second part is expected to answer the 
following questions: (1) whether the increase in domestic borrowing causes the default 
risk of Vietnam to increase? And (2) whether the determinants of the country credit risk 
differ between macrocosmic factors and global factors? 
In the third part, the relationship between domestic debt and inflation in 
Vietnam from 2000 to 2015 is examined by applying Vector Error Correction Model 
(VECM) and Johansen cointegration technique. This part aims to answer the two sets 
of question that (1) does greater reliance on domestic debt (relative to external debt) 
harm the stability of Vietnam’s economy? (2) Whether there is a present of fiscal 
dominance in Vietnam?. 
The forth part of this study is to examine the link between large public debt and 
high banks’ non-performing loans in Vietnam by using a cross sectional data set 
consisting of 32 Vietnamese banks from 2004 to 2014. Based on the results of one-step 
System GMM estimators developed by Blundell and Bond, the following questions will 
be answer (1) whether an increase in country’s public debt is associated with higher 
non-performing loans (NPLs) of local banks? and (2) whether the responses of 
government to alleviate the issue of NPLs take effect?.  
1.4 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE THESIS 
This paper provides a number of contributions. First, this is the first study on 
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the determinants of sovereign credit risk in case of Vietnam through the use of 5-year 
CDS spreads as indicators for the default probability. The study also includes both 
global and country levels in examining the main factors behind high risk of default of 
Vietnam and provides a more direct concentration on the study of domestic debt, 
making it different from other studies, which focus mainly on external debt dynamics. 
Secondly, in order to capture the determinants of banking’ credit risk of Vietnam, both 
macro and micro-economic factors are used, while existing studies in case of Vietnam 
consist of only macroeconomic level. Thirdly, additional variables are introduced in 
this paper to better explain the behavior of country’s credit risk, economic instability as 
well as banking market risk in recent years, consisting of variables other than those 
commonly used in previous research such as default history of the State-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), bank’s credit to the government and the SOEs, the performance of 
SOEs and bank’s lending rate to private sector customers, output gap of Vietnam and 
China’s output gap as a global factor. Furthermore, unlike previous study, this study also 
focuses on inflationary consequence of the increasing dependence on domestic funding to 
finance budget deficit as compared to external funding. In fact, there have been a number 
of studies on the importance of domestic debt in developing countries including Vietnam, 
however these studies cover only the period when domestic debt of Vietnam accounted for 
a minority of total public debt. This study, fourthly, uses datasets of the most recent time 
periods when domestic debt plays an increasing important role. Last but not least, the 
outcomes of this thesis will help the government of Vietnam and the policymakers to 
understand the importance of domestic debt and come up with a meaningful policy 
response to maximize the benefits of domestic borrowings in enhancing economic 
development by improving debt managements and fiscal adjustments.   
1.5 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
This dissertation includes five chapters:  
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Chapter 1 is a brief introduction. For systematization purposes, the current issue 
of Vietnam’s public debt is summarized. 
Chapter 2 focuses on the macroeconomic determinants of sovereign credit risk 
in Vietnam from January 2005 to December 2014 by using Autoregressive Distributed 
Lag Modeling. 
Chapter 3 examines how an increase in domestic borrowing to finance fiscal 
deficit influences inflation in Vietnam based on quarterly data from March 2000 to 
December 2015 by applying a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) with control 
variables of budget deficit, bank’s credit to private sector and lending interest rate. 
Granger causality test is also employed to examine the debt-inflation relationship.  
Chapter 4 of this dissertation tries to empirically investigate relationship 
between the country’s overall public debt and credit risk of banking market (proxied by 
the level of Non-performing loans (NPLs)) in 32 Vietnamese banks over the period 
from 2004 to 2014 by using one-step System GMM estimators developed by Blundell 
and Bond (1998). 
Chapter 5 reviews the key outcomes of the thesis and their policy implications, 
summarizes the limitations of the thesis as well as other issues for further studies.
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CHAPTER 2 
DOMESTIC DEBT AND SOVEREIGN CREDIT RISK IN VIETNAM 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The assessment of sovereign default risk has become crucial for both central 
governments and international investors, especially since the start of the European debt 
crisis in 2008 – which has made international investors more risk averse and insurance 
seeking, this is mostly due to the fact that the country’s ability to access funding in 
international markets and their willingness to repay the debt depends strongly upon it.  
Identifying the determinants of sovereign credit risk may be exceptionally important 
for emerging countries for which information tends to be more limited in both quality 
and quantity and lending to these economies is subject to a greater informational risk.  
This study, hence, aims to evaluate the determinants of sovereign default risk of 
Vietnam over the period from January 2005 to December 2014 by using 5-year Credit 
Default Swap spread as an indicator of the country risk of default.  The case of 
Vietnam seems to be a very interesting case to study due to its ranking of 12th World’s 
riskiest country in the world to invest according to Bank of America Merrill Lynch and 
the second most risk country in the Southeast Asian region based on AMB Country risk 
report in August 2015, and a dearth of empirical works in this country.  
We particularly concentrate on the explanatory power of the economic 
fluctuation and the domestic component of government debt. The scholarly literature 
on sovereign default has often focused on the size of external debt and economic 
fluctuations, while domestic debt dynamic has received less attention, although it is 
equally important to explain default episodes. The starting point in investigating 
sovereign defaults on domestic debt was the study of Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) in 64 
countries from 1914 to 2007, which shed light on the importance of internal debt in the 
analysis of sovereign defaults. In their study, they catalogue defaults on internal debt, 
which are more difficult to identify than defaults on external debt and point out three 
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key findings demonstrating the importance of internal debt. (1) Internal debt is large 
and accounts for the largest portion of total government debt. (2) Default on internal 
debt is a relatively recent phenomenon and tends to happen in more severe 
macroeconomic conditions. (3) By taking into account domestic debt, the reason why 
many countries default on their external debt at seemingly low levels can be explained 
– in the year of default, the ratio of external debt to total debt in all countries except 
Latin American countries was less than 50 percent.  
This paper contributes to existing literature by (1) examining how global and 
macroeconomic conditions affects sovereign default risk as a pioneering paper in case 
of Vietnam, (2) providing better understanding of the main factors behind the high 
probability of sovereign default which is crucial for government of Vietnam when 
making decisions on adjustment programs concentrating on reducing the cost of 
borrowing in international markets and for international investors when assessing risks 
of their investment in Vietnam, and finally (3) pointing out the role of debt composition 
in determining the country’s default risk through the inclusion of domestic debt.  
Figure 2.1: Vietnam’s 5-year CDS spreads 
 
                                                   Source: Bloomberg 
This study is organized as follows. Section 2 provides brief introduction of Credit 
default swaps. Section 3 summarizes the recent existing literature. Section 4 describes 
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the data and the econometric methodology. Section 5 discusses the results and policy 
implication. 
2.2  CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION 
2.2.1  How do Credit default swaps work? 
A Credit default swap (CDS)- first introduced by JP Morgan in 1997, is an 
over-the-counter derivative that plays a role as an insurance contract designed to 
transfer the credit risk of fixed income products or loans in case of default by a 
reference entity.  
Basically, the protection buyer of a CDS pays the seller a periodic premium 
(known as the CDS spread), which generally remains constant until maturity or a credit 
event occurs (bankruptcy, obligation acceleration, obligation default, failure to pay, 
repudiation or moratorium and restructuring). The CDS spread is usually quoted as a 
percentage in basis points of the notional amount or face value of the underlying 
reference debt. If reference entity - often referred to as a corporation or government - 
fails to meet his debt obligation or other credit events occur, the protection buyer of a 
CDS has the right to sell debts issued by reference entity to the protection seller for 
their par value (physical delivery) or receive a cash settlement equal to the difference 
between the face value of defaulted bonds and its market value. Otherwise, if reference 
entity is not failure to pay a loan or other type of liability and there is no credit event, 
the protection buyer will receive no payoff. 
Figure 2.2: Credit Default Swaps Structure 
 
 
Protection 
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Protection 
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Reference entity is not a party of the agreement. The maturity of most CDS 
contract is vary from 1 to 10 years, but can be shorter or longer based on the 
negotiation between buyer and seller 
2.2.3  The Market for CDSs at a glance 
In the early days of the market, banks were the dominant player who mainly 
used CDS to hedge and manage credit risk associated with its lending activities. 
According to the British Bankers Association, the global CDS market recorded a total 
notional amount outstanding of  $180 billion in 1997 and this figure nearly doubled to 
$300 billion in the first quarter of 1998, with JP Morgan alone contributing about 17 
percent of the total ($ 50 billion).  
As the market becomes larger and established, the use of CDS is not limited to 
only hedging credit risk, but, for speculating and arbitraging by banks, asset managers, 
insurance companies, pension funds and hedge funds.  Starting in 2003, the market for 
CDS expanded tremendously in depth and scale. As can be seen in Figure 2.2, the 
gross notional amounts of the CDS rose almost ten times from $6 trillion in the end of 
2004 to $58 trillion just before the start of the global financial crisis in 2008. This surge 
in the outstanding amount of CDS likely relates to the increasing need to hedge risks 
toward unfavorable global economic conditions. In the subsequent period, the CDS 
market size dropped significantly down to an estimated $12 trillion in the end of 2015.  
In addition to that, according to the IMF, before the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, 
CDS contracts on sovereigns of emerging economies contributed to the large part of 
the CDS market because international investors considered those countries as having 
higher risk of default. However, from the end of 2009, the CDS contracts on sovereign 
of advanced economies have increased significantly, starting from European periphery 
countries. 
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Figure 2.3: Semi annual CDS notional amount outstanding (billion USD) 
 
Source: BIS semiannual OTC Derivatives statistics 
 
Table 2.1: Net Notional Amount Outstanding (billion US dollars) 
Rank  2008 Rank  2010 Rank  2012 
1 Italy 18 1 Italy 26 1 Italy 21 
2 Spain 14 2 France 18 2 Brazil 17 
3 Brazil 10 3 Spain 17 3 France 16 
4 Germany 10 4 Brazil 15 4 Germany 15 
5 Greece 7 5 Germany 15 5 Spain 13 
6 Russia 6 6 Portugal 8 6 Mexico 8 
Source: Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation 
2.2.4  The CDS spread: a market indicator of credit risk 
As the CDS market has become more developed and trade volumes are sizable, 
CDS spreads - defined as the periodic fee or premium paid by protection buyer to the 
seller in exchange for protection against potential credit losses- have offered an 
increasingly accurate benchmark for the credit risk of governments. Along with more 
traditional representation of default risks such as Credit Ratings and Government Bond 
spreads, CDS spreads tend to have a direct proportional relationship with the risk 
perceived by investor toward the underlying asset. The spreads are likely to increase 
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when there is an unfavorable new and decrease in favorable conditions or that is to say 
the larger the CDS spread on a debt instrument, the higher the risk of default on that 
product.  Also, the use of CDS spread as a proxy for sovereign credit risk has been 
increasing significantly in the recent literature because of its determination in credit 
price discovery.  
Both CDS spreads and Bond spreads have been alternatively used as a gauge for 
credit risk assessment since they exhibit significant and similar dependence on 
economic fundamentals, and affected by financial market risks similarly (IMF, 2013)9. 
According to Duffie (1990), under a no-arbitrage condition, the probability of default 
can be estimated and predicted by using either the interest rate spreads on bond or risk 
premium from the CDS. However, a number of studies investigates that CDS spreads 
have more favorable characteristics measurement as a valuable market-based 
assessment of credit risks compared to bond spreads, those are:   
- CDS spreads tend to lead bond spread changes in terms of price discovery 
i.e CDS spreads are likely to move first in reaction to an event and then bond 
prices will shifts towards the pricing in the CDS market as documented in 
Blanco et al (2005), Norden and Weber (2004). Fontana and Scheicher (2010) 
also suggest that since the start of the European debt crisis, the bond market 
leads the credit risk price discovery process in more economically advanced 
countries such as Germany, France, Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands, 
while the CDS market plays a predominant role in the most crisis-affected 
countries including Italy, Ireland, Spain, Greece and Portugal.  
- The CDS spread does not contain a significant liquidity premium as bond 
spreads 
Amato and Remolona (2003), Longstaff et al (2005), Chen et al (2007) and 
Elton et al (2004) suggest that corporate bond yields and prices are significantly 																																																								9	A New Look at the Role of Sovereign Credit Default Swaps, IMF April 2013.	
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influenced by tax issues and liquidity risk while the CDS spread is not driven by 
tax effects and does not contain liquidity components (Fabozzi et al (2007) 
- The CDS spread provides a more direct estimation of credit risk 
The bond yield spread is calculated by subtracting a risk free interest rate from 
bond yield. Consequently, both reference risk free rates and zero-coupon yield 
curve methods can distort the level of bond spreads. CDS spreads, in contrast, 
are already spreads paid by protection buyer to the seller in return for an 
insurance against default risk and therefore do not need to extract from bond 
yields.  
Another important indicator for sovereign default risk is credit rating, which is 
an evaluation of the creditworthiness of a sovereign borrower determined by regulated 
rating agencies such as Standard and Poor’s, Fitch and Moody’s. In theory, CDS 
spreads and credit ratings should convey similar information about a country’s 
fundamentals, such that if credit rating reflects the debtor’s trustworthiness, then it 
should have a negative relationship with the CDS spread of this entity, meaning that 
higher credit rating correspond to lower CDS spread.  Nonetheless, there have been 
some studies finding a gap between CDS spreads and the credit ratings.  Chava et al 
(2012), for example, studied the relationship between CDS spreads and credit ratings 
by using a wide range of data from January 1996 to December 2010 in 1142 firms, and 
found that CDS spreads respond more quickly to perceived default risk than credit 
ratings, or in other words CDS spreads provide information that can predict the 
possibility of credit rating downgrades (or upgrades).  Similar results were suggest by 
Hull, Predescu and White (2004), Micu et al (2006), Jacobs et al (2010) and Norden 
(2011), whose results indicated that CDS spreads are more quickly to price credit risk 
than credit ratings.  
2.3  LITERATURE REVIEW 
The recent literature on investigating the fundamental factors behind the default 
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risk of governments appears to focus on both the effects of global factors as potential 
determinants as well as macroeconomics fundamentals.  
Country-specific factors 
In case of developed countries, Dieckmann and Plank (2011) conduct a cross 
sectional regression analysis using CDS panel data in 18 countries. They incorporate 
variables such as exchange rate reserve, volatility of terms of trade, stock market 
volatility, the foreign exchange rate, and debt to GDP ratio and find that most of these 
variables have significant effect on the level of CDS spreads. In a related study, 
Fabozzi et al (2007) use a set of CDS bid-ask price of 1372 entities in US from 2000 to 
2003 and explore that the main determinants of CDS spreads are interest rate, credit 
rating, sector and liquidity factors.  
Ramos-Francia and Rangel (2012) used a panel of 26 developed and developing 
countries from 2000 to 2009 to investigate the role of macroeconomic factors, 
including real GDP, inflation, current account deficit, fiscal deficit, exchange rates and 
international reserves in determining sovereign credit risk. For both developed and 
developing economies, inflation rate, current account deficit and fiscal deficit is 
positively related to sovereign spreads, while the relationship between real GDP growth 
rate and sovereign spreads is negative. The author also found econometric evidence 
that sovereign spread is negatively influenced by international reserves and exchange 
rate overvaluation. 
There have been also some studies highlighting the role of the fiscal variable 
such as budget balance and government debt level as an important determinant of the 
sovereign default risk.  Using spread between lending interest rate and the Libor rate as 
a proxy for default risk in 19 countries from 1976 to 1980, Edwards (1983) suggests 
that debt-related variables (debt to GNI ratio, debt service ratio and debt duration), 
current account, investment levels, international reserves, import to GDP ratio and per 
capital GDP are important predictors of sovereign default risk. Maltritz (2012) 
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investigate the determinants of sovereign credit risk through the use of sovereign yields 
spreads in EMU countries from 1999 to 2009. Based on the results of Bayesian Model 
Averaging method, the author report fiscal dimension to be significant credit risk driver. 
Similarly, in a more recent study conducted in Eurozone economies over the period 
from 1970 to 2007, Ghosh et al. (2013) apply OLS regression technique and find that 
fiscal space – the difference between the debt level and debt limit - is a matter for the 
probability of sovereign default and thus for CDS spreads.  
Global factors  
In addition to country specific fundamentals, some of the empirical papers find 
evidence that CDS prices are strongly driven by global factors particularly the US 
factors. For example, Pan and Singleton (2008) found that credit spreads for some 
emerging markets (Mexico, Turkey and South Korea) from March 2001 to August 
2006 are largely related to the global risk aversion measured by VIX index. Fender et al 
(2012) investigated that CDS spreads for 12 emerging countries from different regions 
between April 2002 and December 2011 changes stem from US bond, equity, high 
yield and emerging credit returns, especially after the collapse of Lehman Brother.  In a 
larger sample of 26 emerging and advanced countries over a 10-year period, Longstaff 
et al (2011) documents that global financial market conditions affects the level of CDS 
spreads more strongly than the country specific macroeconomic factors. Similarly, 
Heinz and Sun (2014) also find an evidence of the effects of global factors, specifically 
the VIX index, on CDS spreads in 24 European countries between 2007 and 2012.   
In case of China, Eyssell et al. (2013) reported that both internal conditions, including 
stock market index and real interest rate, and external factors – the VIX index – cause 
the movement of CDS spreads of China from January 2001 to December 2010. This is 
consistent with Jens Hilsher and Yves Nosbusch (2010), who assessed the influence of 
macroeconomic and global factors on sovereign credit risk in 31 emerging economies 
between 1994 and 2007, and concluded that internal fluctuations (term of trade 
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volatility, change in terms of trade, default history, debt to GDP ratio and reserves to 
GDP ratio) and external factors (the VIX index) are statistically significant. In Wang et 
al (2013), a data set of 6 Latin American countries over the period from August 2006 to 
September 2010 has been used to examine the determinants of CDS spreads and global 
factors, such as VIX index and TED spread, are found to be the main factors behind the 
changes of CDS spreads.  
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Table 2.2: Previous studies on the determinant of Country’s Credit risk 
Study Methodology Data Sample Dependent variable 
Significant explanatory variables 
 
Macroeconomic variables Global variables 
Afonso et al 
(2007) Linear regression 
130 countries, 
1970-2005 
Sovereign 
credit ratings 
GDP per capita(+), GDP growth (+), Inflation (-),Unemployment 
(+), External debt ratios (-), Government balance (+), International 
reserves (+), Default history (-), Government effectiveness (+), 
EU countries (+) 
 
Aizenman et 
al (2013), 
OLS and dynamic 
panel estimation 
(GMM) 
20 emerging 
markets in 4 
regions, 2004-
2012 
Sovereign CDS 
spreads 
External debt/GDP (+), inflation (+), state fragility (+), 
commodity terms of trade volatility (+), trade openness (-), fiscal 
balance/GDP (-) 
 
Attinasi, et al 
(2009) 
Dynamic panel 
approach 
10 european 
countries, July 
2007-March 
2009 
Sovereign bond 
spreads 
Expected government budget balance to GDP ratio (-), expected 
government debt to GDP ratio (+), bank rescue package 
announcements (+) 
International risk 
aversion 
Bissoondoyal-
Bheenick 
(2005), 
OLS regressions 95 countries, 1995-1999 
Sovereign 
credit ratings 
GNP per capita (-), Inflation (+), Government debt/GDP (+), 
Foreign reserve (-), Net exports/GDP(-), Unemployment rate (+), 
Current account/GDP (+) , Foreign debt/GDP (+) 
 
Cantor and 
Packer (1996), OLS regressions 
49 countries, 
September 
1995 
Sovereign 
credit ratings 
GDP per capita (+), GDP growth (+), Inflation (-), fiscal balance 
(+), External debt ratios (-), Economic development (+)(proxy by 
minimum income and development level as whether or not a 
country is classified as industrial countries by IMF , Default 
history (-) 
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Dieckmann 
and 
Plank(2011), 
Cross-sectional 
panel regression 
18 advance 
economies, 
January 2007 to 
April 2010 
CDS spreads 
Debt/GDP(+), Exchange rate reserves (-), terms of trade volatility 
(+), stock market volatility (+), stock market index (-), the FX 
rate (+) 
Eurostoxx 50 
index, 10 year 
German Bund 
yield spread 
Edwards 
(1983), 
Pooled cross 
section time series 
19 least 
developed 
countries, 
1976-1980 
Spread between 
lending interest 
rate charged to 
a country and 
the LIBOR 
Debt-GNP ratio (+), debt service to exports ratio (+), international 
reserves to GNP (-), loan duration (-), loan volume (-), 
Investment to GNP ratio (-), current account to GNP ration (+), 
ratio of import to GNP (-), per capita GDP (+) 
 
Fender et al 
(2012), GARCH models 
Emerging 
markets, April 
2002 - 
December 2011 
Sovereign CDS 
spreads 
Budget deficit/GDP (+), credit rating (-), foreign currency income 
(+), fiscal policy (-) (significant only before financial crisis) 
VIX (-), US 3 
month rate (+), 
EMBIG spread 
(+) 
Ghosh et al 
(2013) OLS regression 
Eurozone, 
1970-2007 
Sovereign CDS 
spreads 
Fiscal space (-), GDP per capita (-), Trade openness (+), Current 
account balance (-), Fiscal balance (-)  
Heinz and Sun 
(2014), 
Panel generalised 
least square (GLS) 
24 countries in 
Europe, 
monthly period 
from 2007-
2012 
CDS spreads Forecast of fiscal deficit (-), real GDP growth (-) and current account balance (+), public debt to GDP ratio of previous year (+) 
VIX index (+), 
Euro area dummy 
(-) 
Hernandez-
Trillo (1994), Probit analysis 
33 debtor 
countries in 
1983 
Probability of 
default Degree of openess (-), International reserves (-)  
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Hilcher and 
Nosbusch 
(2010), 
Baseline, Linear 
regression 
31 emerging 
economies, 
1994-2007 
CDS spreads Change in terms of trade (-), volatility of terms of trade (+), default history (-), Debt/GDP (+), Reserves/GDP (-) VIX index (+) 
Longstaff et al 
(2011) 
Regression 
Analysis 
26 countries, 
October 2000-
January 2010 
CDS spreads Local stock market return, changes in exchange rate, changes in international reserves, 
US stock market 
returns, global 
sovereign CDS 
spreads 
Mellios and 
Parget-Blanc 
(2006), 
Ordered logistic 
model 
86 countries, 
December 2003 
Sovereign 
credit ratings 
GDP per capita (+), Government income (+), real exchange rate 
changes (+), Inflation (-), Default history (-), corruption index (+)  
Rowland 
(2004), OLS regression 
50 developing 
countries. July 
2003 
Sovereign 
credit ratings 
GDP per capita (+), GDP growth (+), Inflation (-), External debt 
ratios (-), International reserves (+), Openness (+)  
Remolona et 
al (2007) , 
Fixed effects 
dynamic panel 
regression 
24 countries, 
2002-2006 CDS spreads 
Inflation (+), Industrial production (-), foreign exchange reserves 
(-) 
VIX (+), risk 
appetite (-), G-10 
countries Risk 
tolerance index 
(+), Emerging 
markets risk 
tolerance index 
(+) 
Yahya, CEPN 
and Erudite 
(2013),) 
Autoregressive 
distributed lag 
modeling (ARDL 
6 European 
countries, 
1999-2009 
Treasury bond 
yield 
Lagged bond yield (-), Long term interest rate (+), short term 
interest rate, Gross fixed capital formation, Debt to GDP ratio, 
Unemployment rate  
Yuan and 
Pongsiri 
(2013), 
OLS regression 
with fixed effects 
36 countries, 
2005-2011 CDS spreads 
Gross debt (+), Future government balance (-), Future GDP (-), 
real GDP growth (-), government bond spreads (+), central bank 
policy rates (-), inflation (+), effective exchange rates (-)  
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2.4  DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
2.4.1 The Data 
Data 
The monthly data used in this study covers the time spanning from January 2005 
to December 2014. Five-year CDS spreads are used as a proxy for government credit risk 
since it is the most traded in the CDS market and the data on spreads are obtained from 
the Bloomberg database. 
Choice of Variables 
Macroeconomic variables:  
Domestic government debt 
Government debt is the liabilities of government in both domestic and 
international market.  Most of the existing studies on sovereign default risk find that high 
level of debt that government borrow from foreign investors is associated with high 
possibility of government default. However, these studies have focused mainly on the 
fundamental of external debts, while very little research has studied the effect of domestic 
debts although in fact defaults on domestic debt happen as frequent as defaults on 
external debts (Arellano et al, 2009 and Jeanneret et al, 2016). Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2008) explore the importance of domestic debt and conclude that there has been “a 
forgotten history of domestic debt”. By cataloguing domestic debt defaults from the 
database of 64 defaulting countries between 1914 and 2007, they find that governments 
tend to choose to default on domestic debt in periods of high inflation. However, when 
the adverse effect of credit contraction due to sovereign defaults on domestic debt is more 
severe than the high inflationary effect, defaulting on domestic debts appears to be less 
favorable. This is due to the mechanism that sovereign defaults on domestic debts worsen 
the balance sheets of domestic investors, particularly the banking sectors, thereby 
impairing domestic credit and output. In an economy where firms are highly dependent 
on bank’s credit and the effect of a contraction of credit supply appears to be stronger, the 
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government then would have less incentive to default on their domestic debts (Sandleris, 
2012).  This indicates that the government’s decision to default on which debt securities 
depends on its political policies and the economic costs.  
Table 2.3 presents the link between sovereign default and domestic debt from 
1980 to 2005.  During that period, there have been 49 default-episodes and 20 of those 
have been related to the domestic debt. 
Table 2.3: Episodes of Sovereign defaults 
 External Debt Domestic Debt External and Domestic Debt 
Observations 26 8 12 
Percentage 53% 17% 24% 
Source: Arellano and Kocherlakota (2009) 
In Vietnam, the share of domestic borrowings has increased significantly since 
2009 when the country moved to middle-income country group, which means that the 
country would no longer receive preferential external debts with low interest rate and 
long maturity. In the face of decreasing external debts, the government of Vietnam has 
turned to internal debts for financing of deficit. Consequently, the rapid expansion of 
public debt in recent years has been mainly driven by an increase in domestic public debt 
at a rate that has outpaced the growth rate of GDP. According to the report of WorldBank 
in 2015, the ratio of internal debt to total public debt of Vietnam increased significantly 
from 45% in 2010 to 53% in 2015 and debt service payment accounted for more than 25 
percent of government revenue in the end of 201410. As domestic debts tend to have 
higher interest rate and shorter maturity, greater reliance on internal financing source is 
likely to increase average interest rate and decrease the maturity profile of country’s 
public debt. This, in turn, might result in additional pressure of debt repayments. In 
addition, local firms in Vietnam still rely heavily on credit provided by commercial banks 
																																																								
10 World Bank (2015): “ An update on Vietnam’s recent economic developments” 
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- the major holders of government domestic debt. A contraction in credit then would 
threaten the economy and therefore giving the government more incentive to default on 
its external debt instead of domestic debt. An increase in domestic debt, consequently, is 
expected to positively affect the country’s CDS spreads.  
Output gap of Vietnam 
Output gap is considered as an indicator of economic slack and often used to 
measure the degree of overheating or slack in relation to potential economic growth.  In 
this study, output gap is defined as the difference between actual monthly industrial 
production index (in natural logarithm) and potential industrial production index (in 
natural logarithm), whereby the potential industrial production index is obtained by using 
Hodrick-Prescott Filter (with λ = 14400). Higher output gap is associated with the 
improving economic growth, thus enhancing the solvability of the borrowing country and 
reducing the possibility of default.   
Studying sovereign risk dynamics in a framework of two-county monetary union, 
Christian and Benjamin (2015) find that while government seems to focus mainly on 
fiscal consolidation as the main factor driving sovereign credit risk, financial markets care 
more about the output gap of the country. In addition to that, economic growth of 
Vietnam is still on an unsustainable trend due to the heavy dependence on the exploitation 
and the use of natural resources and low value-added industries, while some of the 
country’s strengths such as tourism and agriculture are being constrained. Output gap, 
therefore, provides more information as compared to economic growth because it 
includes potential growth. 
Volatility of terms of trade 
Term of trade volatility is the standard deviation of the monthly percentage 
change in terms of trade (12 months rolling standard deviation). Term of trade is 
calculated as the ratio of country export prices to import prices. To estimate the monthly 
term of trade, I collect data on export and import quantities and prices from website of 
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General statistics office of Vietnam and then construct Laspeyres fixed weighted export 
and import price index. The commodities in the basket are coffee, rubber, tea, crude oil, 
petroleum oil, rice, cashew nut, pepper, coal, car, fertilizers, fibres, plastic materials, 
paper, textile products, iron and steel, which the price and quantity data can be matched.  
Unlike developed countries whose economies tend to be more diversified, the 
export revenue of Vietnam still rely heavily on primary products such as rice, coffee, 
crude oil, textiles and so on, although the trend is decreasing (Table 2.4). The export 
revenue, therefore, tends to be more exposed to the shocks resulting from price volatility 
of primary commodities in the world markets. Consequently, the volatility of commodity 
price can be considered as an important factor determining economic instability and 
uncertainty (WorldBank, 201011). A higher term of trade volatility, hence, might result in 
a higher probability of default (Aizenman, et al 2013). Jens Hilsher and Yves Nosbusch 
(2010) also found an evidence that the fluctuations of terms of trade is important for 
explaining high sovereign credit risk 
Table 2.4: Exports of goods by Standard International Trade Classification 
  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
TOTAL VALUE (mil USD)  72,236   96,906   114,529   132,033   150,217  
Primary goods  30,588   39,554   41,768   43,230   44,756  
Percent of total (%) 42% 41% 36% 33% 30% 
Food, food stuff and live animals  11,234   13,937   14,615   14,773   17,037  
Beverages and tobacco  2,052   2,966   3,899   2,947   3,785  
Crude materials, inedible, except 
fuels  14,342   18,905   20,153   23,289   22,277  
Mineral fuels, lubricants and 
related materials  2,961   3,746   3,101   2,222   1,656  
Manufactured products  35,676   52,419   63,817   79,551   95,771  
Percent of total (%) 49% 54% 56% 60% 64% 
Chemical and related products  639   956   1,091   1,288   1,725  
Manufactured goods classified 
by materials  22,803   30,259   28,331   33,089   37,129  
Machinery, transport and 
equipment  10,918   19,591   32,399   44,496   50,218  
Miscellaneous manufactured 
articles  1,316   1,613   1,995   678   6,698  
																																																								11	The World Bank Economic Premise Note, No.13, 2010: Subnational Debt Finance and the 
Global Financial Crisis. 
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Others   5,972   4,932   8,944   9,252   9,690  
Percent of total (%) 8% 5% 8% 7% 6% 
Source: Official monthly exports of goods, GSO 
International reserves  
International reserves reflect international liquidity, financial capacity and the 
willingness of a country to meet its foreign-debt obligations (Thomas, 2010)12. Remolona 
et al (2007) and Longstaff et al (2011) has found a negative relationship between 
international reserve and CDS spreads, an increasing international reserve reduces the 
default probabilities of a government.  
Default of the VINASHIN 
The inclusion of this variable is motivated by Reinhart et al. (2003) and Hilcher 
and Nosbusch (2010), who argue that a history of default is likely to negatively affects the 
default risk of a country. To date, Vietnam has not defaulted on its debt repayments, but 
the failure of a State-backed Corporation, specifically the VINASHIN – a state-owned 
shipbuilder - to make a U.S. $60 million loan repayment in December 2010, had been 
considered as a barometer of the country’s creditworthiness. After the event of 
VINASHIN’s default, international lenders and investors had loss their faith in Vietnam’s 
government (Hookway and Tudor, 201113). This was mainly due to the fact that in order 
to help the VINASHIN to obtain an additional $600 million syndicated debt in 2007; the 
government of Vietnam sent a letter of support for the company to the lenders. However, 
when the VINASHIN failed to repay its debt in December 2010, the government refused 
to bail out the company.  Therefore, the default of the VINASHIN is expected to lead the 
Country’s CDS spreads become wider.  The effects of VINASHIN’s default is equals to 
12 (months) when there is an event of default and the following months are set to be 11, 
10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1. 
 																																																								
12 Thomas (2010) defines the capacity of a country to fulfill its debt obligations as the maximum 
amount of foreign currency that the country is spending to repay external borrowings. 13	James Hookway and Alison Tudor (2010): “Behind Firm’s default: Vietnam’s growth Mania”. The 
Wall Street Journal. 	
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Global variables 
Output gap of China  
China has remained the biggest trade partner of Vietnam for a long time. 
According to the data of GSO14, total trade revenue in 2014 between Vietnam and China 
was more than 58 billion dollars (accounting for nearly 20% of total trade revenue). 
Vietnam export products also rely overly on cheap raw materials imported from China, 
and most commodities exported to China are unprocessed with low added value. 
Therefore, China’s output gap might have an impact on the business cycle of Vietnam 
and then it’s sovereign risk.  Output gap of China is also estimated as the difference 
between actual industrial production index and the potential industrial production index 
(both series are in natural logarithm), the potential industrial production index is 
calculated using Hodrick-Prescott Filter (with λ = 14400). 
VIX index:  
The volatility index of the Chicago Board options exchange is a measure of 
uncertainty of risk aversion of global market (Ghosh et al ,2012). Higher VIX index is 
associated with higher CDS spreads (Pan and Singleton, 2008). 
In summary, this section empirically tests the following hypotheses: 
• Hypothesis 1: Higher output gap leads to lower risk of default and then lower CDS 
spreads. 
• Hypothesis 2: Higher terms of trade volatility tend to increase CDS spreads (more 
prone to external shocks). 
• Hypothesis 3: To the extent that higher international reserves increase financial 
capacity of the country, the CDS spreads then should be negatively associated 
with international reserves.  
• Hypothesis 4: Since expensive domestic borrowing increases pressure on 
government budget and leads higher possibility of default, domestic debt then is 																																																								14	https://gso.gov.vn	
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expected to positively related with spreads. 
• Hypothesis 5: Default of VINASHIN leads to higher CDS spreads. 
• Hypothesis 6: An increase in China’s output gap cause CDS spreads of Vietnam to 
decrease. 
• Hypothesis 7: Higher VIX index is associated with higher CDS spreads. 
In this study, all the variables were converted into log form except DEFAULT of 
the VINASHIN, output gap of Vietnam and China.  All the data series used are monthly 
data from January 2005 to December 2014.  The definitions and descriptions of variables 
are indicated in Table 2.5 and Table 2.6. From table 2.6 it can be seen that the output gap 
of Vietnam has highest standard deviation with respect to the mean, this once again 
suggests that the economy of Vietnam is highly volatile and uncertainty.  
Table 2.5: Definitions of Variables 
Variables Definition Source Expected Sign 
LNCDS Natural Logarithm of 5-year CDS spreads Bloomberg  
LNDEBT Natural Logarithm of domestic debt outstanding value Bloomberg      (+) 
GAPVN Output gap of Vietnam 
Calculation based on 
monthly industrial 
production index 
(2005=100) data 
obtained from CEIC 
(-) 
LNTOTVOL Natural logarithm of terms of trade volatility 
Author’s calculation 
based on monthly 
statistical data of GSO 
(+) 
LNRESERVE Natural logarithm of international reserve IFS (-) 
GAPCHINA Output gap of China  
Calculation based on 
monthly industrial 
production index 
(2005=100) data 
obtained from CEIC 
(-) 
LNVIX Natural logarithm of VIX index Chicago Board Options Exchange (+) 
DEFAULT Default of the VINASHIN  (+) 
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Table 2.6: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Std.Dev Minimum Maximum No of Obs 
LNCDS 5.357 0.541 4.025 6.345 120 
LNDEBT 23.224 0.887 21.205 24.554 120 
GAPVN -0.128 4.958 -17.273 15.442 120 
LNTOTVOL 0.853 0.751 -1.478 2.128 120 
LNRESERVE 23.591 0.415 22.776 24.322 120 
GAPCHINA -0.059 2.554 -8.317 4.618 120 
LNVIX 2.922 0.383 2.343 4.093 120 
 
2.4.2  Methodology 
Model Specification 
The relationship between country credit default risk and their determinants will be 
examined in the long and short run employing the Autogressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) 
bound test developed by Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001). One of the advantages of using 
ARDL technique is that it does not require variables be of the same order of integration. It 
can be used whether the variables are I(0) or I(1). In time series analysis, use of first 
differenced variable in regression models is necessary to reduce the spurious results when 
variables have unit root or non-stationary. However, when variables are used in first 
differenced, long run information from the data is removed, the model hence can only 
provide partial information on relationship between variables (short run relationship). 
Model that use only differenced data may be mis-specified if there exist such long 
influences, leading to biased parameter estimates. Application of ARDL bounds testing 
approach to cointegration allows us to examine long-run relationship between sovereign 
credit risk and its determinants. Following Hilcher and Nosbusch (2010) approach for 
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estimating the determinants of sovereign credit risk, to estimate the determinants of 
Vietnam’s credit risk, the following equation is modeled: !"#$%& = 	)* + ),!"$-./& +	)01234"& + )5!"/6/46!& + )7!"8-%-84-& +)9123#:;"2& + )<!"4;=& + )>$-?2@!/& +	A&    (1) 
Testing for Stationary 
To apply ARDL bound test, it is important to ensure that the variables under 
consideration are not I(2). If one of variables in the model are found to be I(2), then the 
computed F-statistics developed by Pesaran et al (2001) and Narayan (2005) are no 
longer be valid (Ouatarra, 2004).Therefore, I first conduct ADF unit root test to ensure 
that all data series are not I(2). The results are summarized in table 2.6.  
Bound Testing Approach 
ARDL bounds testing approach to co-integration is employed to examine long-run 
relationship among the series in the model. The Bound test has a number of advantages in 
comparison to Johansen co-integration test. For example, it is applicable irrespective of 
the degree of integration of the variables and thus avoids the pre-testing of the order of 
integration of the variables, long-run and short-run parameters of the model are estimated 
simultaneously since it takes into account the error correction term in its lagged period, 
and being more robust and performs better for small sample sizes (Ghatak and Siddiki, 
2001). Moreover, according to the study of Odhiamho (2008), ARDL Bound test can 
provide consistent and unbiased long-term estimates even if some of the model regressors 
are found to be endogenous.   
The general form of an ARDL model is as follows: 
B&	 = 	C* + )DE, B&FD + GHD
IJ
*
K
, 	=H&FD + A& 
Where:  
Y is the natural logarithm of 5-year CDS spreads, 
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n is the lags of dependent variable, =H is the explanatory variable number j, 
m is the number of exogenous variables, LH	is the selected lags of regressor j A& is the error term 
The unrestricted error correction model derived from ARDL model for equation 
(1) is expressed as follows: 
Δ!"#$%&	 = 	C* + )DEDN, Δ!"#$%&FD +	 G,D
IO
DN* Δ!"$-./&FD + G0D
IP
DN* Δ1234"&FD
+ G5DIQDN* Δ!"/6/46!&FD + G7D
IR
DN* Δ!"8-%-84-&FD
+ G9DISDN* Δ123#:;"2&FD +	 G<D
IT
DN* Δ!"4;=&FD + U,!"#$%&F,+	U0!"$-./&F, + U51234"&F, + U7!"/6/46!&F,+ U9!"8-%-84-&F, + U<123#:;"2&F, +	U>!"4;=&F, + V$-?2@!/&+	A& 
Where: UD is the long-run multipliers, 
n is the lags of dependent variable, LH	is the selected lags of regressor j A& is the error term 
The null hypothesis of the existence of long-term relationship among variables is 
(:*:	U, = 	U0 = U5= U7=U9 = 	U< = U> = 	0) and the alternative of cointegration is 
(:,:	U, ≠ 	U0 ≠ U5 ≠ U7 ≠ U9 ≠ 	U< ≠ U> ≠ 	0) 
The ARDL technique consists 2 steps. The first step is to confirm the existence of 
a long-term co-integration relationship among variables by using the Wald-test (F-test). 
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According to Pesaran et al (2001), if the calculated F-statistic is higher than the upper 
bound, the null hypothesis of no long-run relationships between variables can be rejected. 
In contrast, if the computed F-statistic is lower than the upper bound, the null hypothesis 
of no co-integration cannot be rejected, meaning that there is no long-term relationship 
between dependent and explanatory variables in the model.  
Once the series are found to be co-integrating, the next step is to estimate the long 
run and short-run model. 
The long-run model for CDS can be estimated as: 
!"#$%& = 	C* +	 		EDN, U,!"#$%&FD +	 		[,DN* U0!"$-./&FD + 		[0DN* U51234"&FD+ 		[5DN* U7!"/6/46!&FD + 		[7DN* U9!"8-%-84-&FD+ 		[9DN* U<123#:;"2&FD + 		[<DN* U>!"4;=&FD + V$-?2@!/& +	A& 
The short run causality can be determined by using an error correction model 
(ECM) of equation (2): 
Δ!"#$%&	 = 	 µ + )DEDN, Δ!"#$%&FD +	 G,D
IO
DN* Δ!"$-./&FD + G0D
IP
DN* Δ1234"&FD
+ G5DIQDN* Δ!"/6/46!&FD + G7D
IR
DN* Δ!"8-%-84-&FD
+ G9DISDN* Δ123#:;"2&FD +	 G<D
IT
DN* Δ!"4;=&FD + 	]-#/&F, +	A&	 
Where ] is the speed of adjustment and ECTaF, is the error correction term 
obtained from the long-term relationship; the coefficient of ECT is expected to be 
negative and statistically significant.  
Relevant diagnostic tests (normality, serial correlation and heteroscedasticity test) 
and stability tests (CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests) are next conducted to access the 
goodness of fit of the model.  
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The orders of the lags in the model are selected by using the Akaike Information 
Criteria (AIC). 
2.5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
2.5.1 Results of Unit Root Tests 
Table 2.7:  Results of Unit Root Test 
Variables 
ADF test statistics 
Phillips-Perron test 
statistic Order of 
Integration 
Level 
First 
Differences 
Level 
First 
Differences 
LNCDS -1.560 (0) -9.911(0)*** -1.716 -9.873*** I(1) 
LNDEBT -2.528(1) -7.852(0)*** -2.520 -7.884*** I(1) 
GAPVN -5.135(11)*** -4.271(12)*** -9.060*** -35.768*** I(0) 
LNTOTVOL -2.143(5) -2.136(4)** -1.375 -2.333** I(1) 
LNRESERVE -1.663(1) -6.121(0)*** -1.380 -6.152*** I(1) 
GAPCHINA -3.682(4)*** -2.956(3)** -2.417 -10.133*** I(0) 
LNVIX -0.182(0) -12.169(0)*** 0.065 13.461*** I(1) 
Note: Lags are given in parentheses. ***, ** denotes statistic significance at the 1% and 5% 
levels respectively. The null hypothesis of the ADF test and PP test is that the variable has a 
unit root.  
According to Unit root test results (Table 2.7), the variables in this study are a mix 
of I(0) and I(1) series. The cointegration test methods based on Johansen (1991; 1995) 
and the Johansen-Juselius (1990) requires that all variables are the same intergration, i.e, 
I(1). Therefore, this study will apply ARDL modeling approach for cointegration analysis. 
2.5.2 Bound Testing Results 
The results of ARDL Bounds Test in Table 2.8 shows that the estimated F-statistic 
(6.28) exceeds the upper bound critical values at even 1% level of significant, meaning 
that the null hypothesis of no cointegration can be rejected at 1 percent level. As such 
cointegration examining long-run relationship exists between variables in the model. 
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Table 2.8 Results of ARDL Bounds Test 
Dependent Variable: LNCDS 
Null Hypothesis: No cointegration 
          Test Statistic Value15 
          F-statistic 6.28 
               
Critical Value Bounds   
          Significance Lower Bound (I0) Upper Bound (I1) 
     10% 2.12 3.23 
5% 2.45 3.61 
1% 3.15 4.43 
Note: ***, ** show the significant at 1% and 5% level respectively, the number 
of regressors, k=6, Unrestricted Intercept and No trend. 
 
2.5.3  Long-run results 
The long-run results (Table 2.9) show that variables capturing internal public debt 
burden (LNDEBT), economic uncertainty (LNTOTVOL), and the global volatility index 
(VIX) have the expected signs and are statistically significant, whereas the international 
reserve, which represents financial capacity of the country, Chinese economy and the 
Default of the VINASHIN (DEFAULT) are found not to have any significant effect of 
default risk of Vietnam in the long run.  
The transmission response of CDS spreads to the domestic debt level is positive 
and significant at 5 percent level. A 1 percent increase in domestic debt will lead to about 
0.43 percent increase in the CDS spreads in long-term. This confirms to the expectation 
that high expensive domestic debt level can add a further debt-burden on Vietnam’s 
government and therefore leads to higher possibility of government’s default on their 
external debt in the future.  																																																								15	Source of critical values for the bound test: Table C1(iii) of Pesaran, Shin and Smith 
(2001)	
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In addition to that, the economic uncertainty variable, which is represented by 
terms of trade volatilities (LNTOTVOL), has the expected positive sign, though being 
significant at only 10% level, meaning that higher volatility of terms of trade is 
associated with higher default possibilities. This result is consistent with the finding of 
Hilcher and Nosbusch (2010). Specifically, a 1 percent increase in the volatility of terms 
of trade cause the long-run CDS spread to increase by 0.20 percent.  The weak evidence 
that an increase in terms of trade volatility cause the country’s default risk to rise can be 
explained due to the gradual shift from primary commodities to manufactured 
commodities in the export activities of Vietnam during the observed period. The positive 
link between sovereign credit risk and terms of trade volatility can also suggest that CDS 
spreads appear plausible on economic grounds given that Vietnam is still primary 
commodity exporter.  
Output gap (GAPVN), however, exerts a surprisingly positive effect on the risk of 
default in case of Vietnam, although the magnitude of the positive impact is relatively 
weak as a 1 percent change in output gap leads to only a 0.080 percent change in the price 
of CDS. This might because of the fact that the economic growth of Vietnam is highly 
volatile and often unsustainable, stemming from the dependence of export base on low 
value-added primary products, low-level skills of the labor force and the exploitation of 
natural resources. This, in turn, can make the country more prone to external shocks and 
the fluctuations of the world economy; and thus increase the possibility of default in the 
long term. Besides that, the relentless focus on achieving high level of economic growth 
of Vietnamese government through the use of domestic borrowing in recent years can 
also have a destabilizing impact on the health of the economy, resulting in a higher 
sovereign credit risk.  
The results also indicate that there is a significant long-run relation between 
Vietnam’s CDS spreads and the global financial market conditions as measured by the 
VIX. In particular, a 1% increase in the global risk aversion would raise CDS spreads by 
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0.76% in long-term (significant at 5% level of confidence). This result is in accordance 
with Pan and Singleton (2008), who suggest that sovereign credit spreads are strongly 
affected by the VIX index. The significant relationship between Vietnam’s CDS spreads 
and the VIX index could support a view of the global financial market in which foreign 
investors play a significant role. 
Table 2.9 Long-run model for the selected ARDL(4,0,2,0,2,2,1) Based on 
Akaike Information Criteria 
Dependent variable: LNCDS 
Independent Variables Coefficients T-statistic 
LNDEBT 0.429** 2.471 
GAPVN 0.080*** 2.861 
LNTOTVOL 0.202* 1.951 
LNRESERVE -0.311 -0.784 
GAPCHINA 0.084 1.248 
LNVIX   0.757** 2.328	
DEFAULT 0.045 1.143 
C 0.339 0.053 
Note: *** and ** denote the significant at 1% and 5% level respectively 
2.5.4 Short-run results 
The results of error correction model are presented in Table 2.10. 
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Table 2.10 Error correction model for the selected ARDL(4,0,2,0,2,2,1) Based on 
Akaike Information Criteria 
Dependent variables: D(LNCDS) 
Independent Variables Coefficients T-statistic 
D(LNCDS(-1)) -0.086 -0.871 
D(LNCDS(-2)) -0.227** -2.489 
D(LNCDS(-3)) -0.156* -1.756 
D(LNDEBT) 0.078 1.576 
D(GAPVN) 0.004 1.535 
D(GAPVN(-1)) -0.007** -2.565 
D(LNTOTVOL) 0.037* 1.682 
D(LNRESERVE) -0.428 -1.442 
D(LNRESERVE(-1)) -0.622** -2.123 
D(GAPCHINA) -0.017 -0.843 
D(GAPCHINA(-1)) -0.059*** -3.101 
D(LNVIX) 0.316*** 4.952 
D(DEFAULT) 0.008 1.291 
ECT(-1) -0.180** -3.047 
 
 
Diagnostic tests 
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test                       F-statistic = 1.132 (0.346) 
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey Heteroskedasticity Test                  F-statistic = 0.954 (0.436) 
Jarque-Bera Normality Test                                               bc = 1.707 (0.426) 
Ramsey Reset Test (Model Misspecification) F-statistic = 2.811 (0.065) 
Note: *** and ** denote the significant at 1% and 5% level respectively. Figures in parenthesis 
are p-value 
The lagged Error correction term (ECT) has a negative sign and statically 
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significant at 5% level. This again confirms the existence of a stable long-term 
relationship between dependent and independent variables (Banerjere et al, 1998) and the 
coefficient of ECT(-1) captures the speed of adjustment towards long-term equilibrium in 
response to any deviation. In particular, about 18 percent of disequilibria in the price of 
Credit default swap of the previous month’s shock adjust back to the long-term 
equilibrium in the current period. 
According to the results, the lagged output gap of Vietnam is found to be 
statistically significant with negative expected sign in short-term, but the magnitude of 
the effect of lagged output gap on the price of CDS is relatively small as a 1 percent 
change in this variable results in a short-run change of only 0.007 percent in the CDS 
spread (with 5% level of confidence).  This indicates that an increase in output gap - the 
economy is growing at faster than its long-term average rate - only produce a small short-
term improvement in the sovereign creditworthiness of Vietnam. The results also confirm 
the hypothesis that higher financial capacity (presented by international reserves) is 
associated with lower risk of default or lower CDS spreads.  
Both economic uncertainty (measured by LNTOTVOL) and financial capacity 
(measured by LNRESERVE) factors are found to have significant impact on the price of 
Vietnam’s CDS in short time with the expected sign. Similar to the long-run results, the 
short-run results also present a weak association between terms of trade volatility as a 1 
percent increase in the volatility only leads to a 0.037 percent higher in the risk of default 
(with 10% level of significant only).  In contrast, there is relatively strong evidence that 
higher international reserve, which helps to improve the financial condition of the country, 
is essential for short-term improvement of the country’s creditworthiness.  Particularly, a 
1% increase in the lagged international reserve causes the CDS price to decrease by 
0.62% in short-term with 5% level of significant.  
For global variables, CDS spreads of Vietnam are found to response immediately 
to the changes in both the global volatility index (VIX) and Chinese economic conditions 
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(statistically significant at 1% confidence level). Specifically, a 1% increase in the lagged 
output gap of China is associated with a 0.062% decrease in the possibility of default for 
Vietnam and a 1% higher in the global volatility index immediately results in a 0.314% 
rise in the risk of default for the country.  
The default of the VINASHIN appears to not have any significant effect on the 
movement of Vietnam’s CDS price in both short- and long-term. This might because that 
when the VINASHIN failed to fulfill its debt responsibility in December 2010, the 
government of Vietnam refused to bail out the company. 
2.5.5 Diagnostic Tests 
The diagnostics test results also are presented in Table 2.9. According to the 
results of the diagnostic tests, there is no evidence of serial autocorrelation (Breusch-
Godfrey Serial Correlation LM test) and Heteroskedasticity (Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test). 
The Jarque-Bera Normality test confirms that the error term is normally distributed. The 
Reset Test developed by Ramsey (1969)16 shows that there is no functional form 
misspecification in the model.  
2. 5.6  Stability Tests 
The CUSUM and CUSUM of Squares (CUSUMQ) statistics are employed in 
order to examine the stability of the model and the results are indicated in Figure 2.3 and 
Figure 2.4. As shown, the graphs of the CUSUM and CUSUMQ statistics remain within 
the critical boundaries of 5% significance. This suggests that the Null hypothesis of stable 
parameters cannot be rejected17, conforming that all coefficients in the ARDL model are 
stable. 
 
 
 																																																								
16 According to Ramsey (1969), the Null hypothesis of the Reset test is that the functional form of the 
estimations is correctly specified 
17 Bahmani and Oskooee (2004) have noted that if the plot of CUSUM and CUSUMQ statistics stays 
within the critical bounds at 5% level of significant, the null hypothesis (i.e. all coefficients in the 
model are stable) cannot be rejected.  
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Figure 2.3 CUSUM Curve 
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Figure 2.4 CUSUM of Squares Curve 
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2.5.7 Robustness Check 
The robustness of the estimated results is the Toda-Yamamoto causality test 
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approach18. The Toda and Yamamoto causality test has some advantages compared to 
other causality tests since it can be applied regardless the order of integration and whether 
the series are cointegrated or not. 
Table 2.11: Toda-Yamamoto Tests of Granger Causality 
Null Hypothesis Lag(k) bc-value P-value Decision 
LNDEBT does not Granger cause LNCDS 4 15.854 0.015** Reject 
LNCDS does not Granger cause LNDEBT 4 4.291 0.637 Accept 
GAPVN does not Granger cause LNCDS 4 11.569 0.072* Reject 
LNCDS does not Granger cause GAPVN 4 11.176 0.083* Reject 
LNTOTVOL does not Granger cause LNCDS 4 7.303 0.294 Accept 
LNCDS does not Granger cause LNTOTVOL 4 4.562 0.601 Accept 
LNRESERVE does not Granger cause LNCDS 4 18.187 0.006*** Reject 
LNCDS does not Granger cause LNRESERVE 4 4.678 0.586 Accept 
GAPCHINA does not Granger cause LNCDS 4 6.338 0.386 Accept 
LNCDS does not Granger cause GAPCHINA 4 7.627 0.267 Accept 
LNVIX does not Granger cause LNCDS 4 36.492 0.000*** Reject 
LNCDS does not Granger cause LNVIX 4 4.646 0.589 Accept 
Note: *, ** denote the rejection of null hypothesis at the 10% and 5% level, respectively. The 
optimal lag length is selected by Akaike Information criterion. The maximum order of 
integration for the group of variables is 1. 
 
The results of the Toda-Yamamoto causality test (Table 2.11) show existence of 
causality running LNDEBT to LNCDS at 5% level of significance, but there is no 
evidence of causality from LNCDS to LNDEBT. This suggests that there is a 
unidirectional causality that runs from domestic debt to sovereign credit risk. The 
causality test results also indicate the existence of a unidirectional causality running from 
LNVIX to LNCDS, and from LNRESERVE to LNCDS at 1% level of significance, and a 
bidirectional causality between output gap and the price of CDS in Vietnam.  
2.6 CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
This study aims to investigate the main determinants of sovereign credit risk in 																																																								18	Toda and Yamamoto (1995) procedure to test for Granger causality is based on the estimation of an 
augmented VAR (k + dmax) model, where k is the optimal lag length and d is the maximum order of 
integration in the VAR model. 
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Vietnam over the monthly period between 2005 and 2014 by employing the ARDL 
technique. We pay special attention to the effects of domestic public debt and the 
volatility of the economy (proxied by terms of trade volatility and country’s output gap). 
Our results based on ARDL approach suggest the existence of the short-run and long run 
causality between variables, in which the global factors, including the global risk aversion 
and China’s output gap, tend to play predominant role in the short-term, while the 
country-specific factors outperform in the long-term. In particular, we find that the 
changes in short-run CDS spreads have been largely driven by the change of Chinese 
economy and the global volatility index. This, again, confirms the strong impacts of 
Chinese economy on the business cycle of Vietnam as the country’s biggest trading 
partner and the significant role of the global investors in determining the country’s credit 
risk. The empirical results also suggest a positive relationship between domestic debt and 
the prices of CDS, suggesting that domestic holding of government debts is also an 
important determinant of the possibility of country’s default on its external debt. However, 
this factor produces its effect in long-term only. Since the effect of credit contraction is 
greater in case of Vietnam (most local firms rely heavily on credits provided by banks- 
the main holder of government’s domestic debt), an increase in domestic borrowing 
which adds more pressure for government budget burden would increase the possibility of 
the country’s default on international debts, instead of default on internal debt, and 
therefore the CDS spreads in the future. In addition, the weak coefficient of the volatility 
variable in the estimation in both short-term and long-term is an indication that terms of 
trade volatility play a declining role in predicting sovereign credit risk. Given the fact that 
Vietnam is still a primary commodity exporter (i.e. the export base still depends on single 
commodity exports), higher fluctuations in terms of trade would make the country to be 
more vulnerable to external shocks and results in a higher risk of default, although the 
effect is relatively small. Unlike previous papers, which find the existence of negative 
correlation between economic improvement and sovereign credit risk, this paper 
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identifies that the effect of country’s output gap is not persistent. Higher output gap 
results in lower short-run CDS spreads but higher long-run sovereign default risk, 
confirming the fact that the economy of Vietnam is highly volatile and uncertainty.   
The results of this study provide important implications for policymakers of 
Vietnam to formulate economic policy. We have identified the main factors behind the 
widening of Vietnam’s CDS spreads over the period from 2005 to 2014. Particularly, 
high terms of trade fluctuations, high reliance on internal debt to meet the financial gap, 
unsustainable economic growth and China’ output gap are found to significantly effect 
the creditworthiness of the government of Vietnam. Therefore, in order to reduce the 
vulnerability of the country to external shocks, it is important to reduce the volatility of 
the economy by improving the country’s export base, specifically increasing the 
proportion of high value-added and more sophisticated products, enhancing the country’s 
strength such as agriculture and tourism; increase the effectiveness of domestic debt 
management as well as reduce the economic dependent on China by diversifying the 
country’s trading partners.  Moreover, the existence of significant positive link between 
domestic borrowing and sovereign credit risk provides awareness within the Government 
of the importance of internal public debt, which has been forgotten or overlooked, in 
determining the sovereign risk. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DOMESTIC DEBT AND INFLATION IN VIETNAM 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The economy of Vietnam is facing persistently high inflation during the last 
couple of years. In 2008, the country’s inflation rate went up unprecedentedly in 17 years 
to two-digit level at 23.12%, making it the worst inflation problems in the Asia region 
(Figure 3.1).  Considering inflation as a monetary phenomenon only, to bring inflation 
under control, the Central Bank of Vietnam increased the base interest rate from 12% to 
14% and refinancing rate from 13% to 15% in late 2008. As a result, the rate of inflation 
was reduced to a single-digit of 7.06% in 2009 and 8.86% in 2010 before reaching 
another double-digit rate in 2011 of 18.68%. This indicates that the monetary policy of 
Vietnamese government seems to ineffectively stabilize the price level or that is to say the 
government of Vietnam has not addressed the issue of inflation properly. In addition to 
that, according to the fiscal theory of price level (first discussed in Woodford, 1994), 
inflation is not only a monetary phenomenon, but also a fiscal phenomenon.  
Therefore, this paper aims to investigate whether the increase in internal 
borrowing to finance fiscal deficit leads to higher inflation in Vietnam.  So far, much of 
the existing studies on domestic debt have been conducted in the context of industrialized 
countries, while the situation of developing countries (specifically Vietnam) is still very 
limited due to the lack of reliable data on domestic debt. This study, hence, contributes to 
the existing literature by empirically testing the effects of an increase in domestic 
borrowing as compared to international borrowing (measured by the ratio of domestic 
debt to external debt) on the inflation of Vietnam over the period from 2000Q1 to 
2015Q4 by applying a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) with control variables of 
budget deficit, bank’s credit to private sector and lending interest rate. Granger causality 
test is also employed to examine the relationship between domestic debt and consumer 
price index.  
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a better understanding of the 
condition of budget deficit and inflation during the studied period in Vietnam. Section 3 
reviews the existing literature concerning the importance of domestic debt. Section 4 
describes the data and methodology used in the study. Section 5 then interpret the results. 
Finally Section 6 presents conclusions and implications.  
Figure 3.1: CPI inflation over time (%) 
Source: World Bank  
 
3.2  BUDGET DEFICIT AND INFLATION OF VIETNAM 
During the period from 2001 to 2014, Vietnam has run an average budget deficit 
of 4% of GDP and a budget surplus was only recorded in 2006, standing at 1.3% of GDP. 
In 2009, Vietnam’s budget deficit reached a peak of 9.30% GDP as a response to the 
negative consequences of the 2008 financial crisis (Figure 3.3). In specific, the 
government’s demand stimulus package of about US$8 billion (VND143 trillion), which 
included tax reduction or exemption, interest rate subsidy and public investment 
enhancing, was implemented in early 2009. In 2013, another economic stimulus package 
worth $1.4 billion  (VND 30 trillion) was released to revive the real estate market, 
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Vietnam China ThaiLand Malaysia
 52 
resulting in an increase in budget deficit to more than 7% of GDP. These economic 
stimulus packages, while supporting economic growth, also caused budget deficit to 
increase and thus led to higher government’s debt burden.  From Figure 3.2, it could be 
seen that inflation is likely to increase after a period of high budget deficit. For instance, 
inflation rate went up unexpectedly to more than 23% in 2008 and 18% in 2011, 
following the significant expansion of budget deficit in 2007 and 2009. This strengthens a 
view that high budget deficit could potentially cause inflation to increase in recent years 
and then results in higher economic instability. From the year of 2000, the government of 
Vietnam does not finance budget deficit by printing money, however budget deficit is still 
highly likely to lead to higher inflation.   
Figure 3.2: Inflation, Economic growth and Budget imbalance 
 
 Source: IMF, MOF 
 
3.3  LITERATURE REVIEW 
In theoretical literature, the relationship between government debt and inflation 
has been first emphasized in the work of Sargent and Wallace (1981), who indicated that 
tighter monetary policy could not result in lower inflation in both short run and long run 
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without any fiscal adjustments.  In an economy with fiscal dominance and real debt, fiscal 
authority independently determines the funding of its budget deficit through new bond 
debt issues and seigniorage, while the monetary authority passively accommodates the 
actions of fiscal authority by inflation. An increase in fiscal deficit financed by debt, 
therefore, would rather lead to higher future money growth and subsequently further 
inflation increase, than higher future taxes.  
More recently, as highlighted by Woodford (1994), the effects of government debt 
on inflation can be explained by the fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL), which 
indicates that in an economy with nominal debt, the price levels are driven mainly by 
fiscal policy and government debt rather than monetary policy. This fiscal theory comes 
in two forms, the weak-form and the strong-form. The weak-form of the FTPL, given 
assumptions that fiscal policy is exogenous and monetary policy is endogenous, argues 
that the level of money growth is set to accommodate fiscal policy to maintain 
government solvency (fiscal dominance) and inflation is, fundamentally, a monetary 
phenomenon.  The strong-form of the FTPL, on the other hand, assumes that both fiscal 
and monetary policy are exogenous and even if money supply is unchanged in response to 
the actions of fiscal authority, government debt can independently influence the price 
level and inflation rate through its impact on aggregate demand and in this case, inflation 
is not necessarily a phenomenon of monetary origins.  
The monetary dominant or Ricardian regime, in contrast, states that fiscal policy 
has to be adjusted in accordance with the targets of monetary policy and thus fiscal 
deficits financed by debt have no effect on the price level and inflation rate. Under this 
regime, households are rational and forward-looking, and they assume that future 
payment, including interest and principle, from current borrowing would have to be 
financed by future taxes. In other words, financing government deficits by debt is 
equivalent to financing by future taxes and government debt is considered as deferred 
monetization (Barro, 1974). Therefore, an increase in domestic debt does not affect total 
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savings, consumption and investment in the economy. However, this equivalence theorem 
relies on a number of assumptions which are unlikely to be found especially in the case of 
Vietnam, e.g. economic agents face no budget constraints, an infinite time horizon, non-
distortionary taxes and perfect capital markets (Veidyanathan, 1993). 
In the empirical literature, a number of studies have analyzed the link between 
public debt and inflation in advanced economies. Most of these studies find that 
government debt does not have a significant effect on inflation; while some of them find 
that public debt and inflation are positively correlated.  Giannitsarou and Scott (2006), for 
example, consider a sample of 6 OECD countries from 1960 to 2005 by using the vector 
autoregression (VAR) methodology developed by Campbell and Shiller (1988). They find 
that the expansion of government debt in these countries did not cause any significant 
change in inflation during the observed period. Applying a simple pooled regression, a 
model of inflation on debt is estimated for G7 countries between 1960 and 1994 by King 
(1998). Empirical results indicate that higher public debt does not produce inflation via 
money growth in these countries during 1960-1994. However, when the author divides 
the sample into two sub-periods, the first period is between 1980-1994 and the second 
covers 1960 to 1970, the coefficients for highly indebted countries turn out to be 
significant with positive sign. Similarly, in case of USA, Kliem et al (2013) evaluate the 
influence of public deficit on inflation over the period 1900-2011. Based on the results of 
TVP-VAR model, they uncover that public deficit is significantly associated with higher 
inflation only in the period from mid-1960s up to 1980, after 1980 the link between 
deficit and inflation remains insignificant. Their findings also suggest that the effect of 
public deficits on inflation relies strongly on the interaction between monetary policy and 
fiscal policy in USA after World War II. Nastansky et al (2014) examine the debt-
inflation relationship in Germany during the period from 1991 to 2000, utilizing VECM 
model and impulse response analysis. Their findings show that public debt has a 
significantly impact on the price level in the long run and the effect of public debt on 
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inflation rate is mainly determined by central bank independence, the higher the 
independency of central bank, the lower the potential impact of debt on inflation. There 
have been some studies that also find no evidence of the relationship between debt and 
inflation in developed countries such as Bleaney (1996) in case of 15 OECD countries, 
Joines (1985) in USA, Taghavi (2000) in Germany, Italy, France and the UK.  
Regarding to the case of developing countries, there is however relatively little 
literature on the relationship between government debt and inflation. By employing 
dynamic panel estimations in 107 economies during the period 1960 to 2001, Catão and 
Terrones (2005) discover that there is a strong positive link between national debt and 
inflation in developing and high-inflation countries, while there is no evidence of 
significant impacts of debt on inflation rate in low-inflation and industrial economies. 
They argue that developing countries tend to have low level of tax collection, stable 
economic and political conditions, high inflation, large budget deficits and limited access 
to external commercial borrowing. As a result, they are likely to depend on monetary 
financing of fiscal imbalance and this, in turn, leads to inflation tax. In a study of 94 
developing and developed countries over the period of 1960-1995, Fischer et al (2002), 
based on the results of the fixed effects model, also find that the relationship between 
national debt and inflation in low-inflation countries is relatively weak, while that in high-
inflation countries during high-inflation episodes becomes stronger. Adopting the OLS 
regression estimation, Ahmad et al (2012) show that for Pakistan during 1972-2009, an 
increase in domestic debt stock and domestic debt servicing significantly leads to a rise in 
the price level. The authors explain that the expansion of domestic debt with high interest 
rate and short maturity causes the cost of internal borrowing to increase, resulting in 
higher budget deficit and the government, consequently, is forced to rely on monetary 
creation to finance its budget imbalances which drives inflation in the future. Further, 
given high and certain return on government domestic debt, the holder of debt could 
receive high return and more income on this instrument, enhancing aggregate demand and 
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the price level, as a result, would increase. Veiga et al (2014) analyze the debt-inflation 
relationship using a data set of 52 African countries between 1950 and 2012 and end up 
with a conclusion that higher public debt is associated with higher inflation rate.  
In general, empirical studies tend to support the positive correlation between 
public debt and inflation in developing countries with high level of debt and inflation, 
while in case of industrial and low-inflation countries the debt-inflation relationship is 
relatively weak. Developing economies, which have low tax collection capacity, high 
inflation rate, large budget deficit, underdeveloped financial system and lower access to 
the world capital market, has been forced to come to other resources of financing to 
overcome its budget difficulties, including domestic debt financing and monetary 
financing.  Domestic debt financing often come with high interest rate and short term, 
which increases the cost of government borrowing, putting additional burden on budget 
balance and thus in turn fuels inflation in long-run.  Monetary financing is, however, 
inflationary itself due to the creation of money and hence causes the price level to rise 
immediately.   
In case of Vietnam, there has been no empirical evidence on the relationship 
between debt and inflation, while much of the literature has concentrated on the growth 
impact of debt, of which there have been two prominent studies. In research of 55 low-
income countries, including Vietnam, over the 1970-1999 period, based mainly on the 
results of System-GMM models, Clements et al (2003) investigated that high levels of 
external debt can harm economic growth due to its effect on the efficiency of financial 
resource allocation rather than its crowding-out effects. The study also supports the debt-
overhang hypothesis that external debt starts to have negative effects on economic growth 
when it reaches a threshold level. In a more recent work, Abbas and Christensen (2007) 
developed a new database of domestic debt of 93 LICs and emerging countries (inclusive 
of Vietnam) between 1975 and 2004 to analyze the effect of domestic debt on economic 
growth. By using Granger-causality technique and System-GMM estimations, the author 
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found that the rising trend in domestic debt is associated with higher economic growth at 
moderate levels and the growth impact of domestic debts mainly through investment 
efficiency channel.  
The findings of two studies above can be explained by the fact that Vietnam’s 
external debt mainly consists of official debts in the form of Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) with very low interest rate and long maturity. This has made the 
government of Vietnam – as characterized by high corruption - less incentive to optimally 
allocate these resources, leading to the slowdown in economic growth. Domestic 
borrowing, in contrast, with greater repayment pressure would urge the government to be 
more careful in using it effectively, resulting in economic growth in the long-run. 
However, these researches covered the period up to 2004 when the country relied heavily 
on international borrowing and the market for government bond was underdeveloped, the 
channel through which government debt can affect the economy, therefore, is limited to 
the investment only.  
However, recently, due to limited access to external sources of funding, the 
government of Vietnam has increasingly financed its budget imbalances by issuing local 
currency bonds, which could directly or indirectly affect inflation.  
The first mechanism through which domestic debt might affect inflation is 
monetary supply. In fact, local commercial banks - as a major holder of G-bond - has 
often used this fixed-income instrument as a collateral for repo transactions with the State 
Bank of Vietnam, leading to an increase in monetary base and thus creating new money 
and causing inflation to rise in the future.  
As for the other channel, domestic debt in the form of government bonds can also 
affect inflation through state investment. Budget deficits offset by the sales of 
government bonds in Vietnam is the direct result of the increasing government 
expenditure and state investment. However, the investment of state sector is less efficient 
than the other sectors such as private sector and FDI sector. Based on the data collected 
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from the General Statistics Office of Vietnam, the capital-output ratio of state sector is 
much higher than that of private sector during the 2000s (Figure 3.11), meaning that it 
requires more investment to produce an additional unit of output than private sector. This 
indicates that funds borrowed by the government have not been used for productive 
investment activities or translated fully into additional output. Thus increasing in 
government expenditure through domestic borrowing only lead to a rise in the demand for 
goods with an adverse consequence on production costs and thus pushing up the price 
level.  
Figure 3.3: The capital-output ratio (%) 
Source: GSO 
 
Therefore, this study aims to investigate the effect of domestic debt on inflation 
and their policy implications in the context of Vietnam from 2000Q1 to 2015Q4 based on 
the model developed by Nastansky et al (2014). The approach of this paper also differs 
from existing empirical studies in that it focuses on the impact of the increasing 
dependence of domestic borrowing as compared external borrowing (as measured by the 
ratio of domestic to external debt) that is, whether higher reliance on domestic debt to 
finance budget deficit cause higher inflation in case of Vietnam.  
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 Hypothesis 8: Increasing reliance on domestic borrowing to finance budget deficit 
leads to a higher inflation in Vietnam. 
 Hypothesis 9: Higher growth rate of credit to private sector is associated with 
higher inflation as credit creation through new credits provided by banks results in 
broader money supply.  
 Hypothesis 10: Larger government budget deficit cause inflation to increase. 
 Hypothesis 11: Higher lending rate to private sector leads to lower inflation. 
Higher lending rate makes the cost of borrowing more expensive and thus discourage 
private sector from borrowing, reducing the creation of new credit and the supply of 
money 
3.4  DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
3.4.1  Data Description 
There have been two main definitions of domestic debt, which has been officially 
adopted by main statistical institutions. The first defines the meaning of domestic debt 
based on the currency of issuance (with domestic debt considered as debt issued in local 
currency) (Bank for International Settlements).  The second definition is based on the 
residence of the lender (domestic debt is debt owed to resident creditors) (IMF, Eurostat, 
UNCTAD).  In Vietnam, there is no statistical information on the residence of 
government debt holders and until recently. Consequently, in this study, domestic debt is 
defined as government debt issued in the local currency under Vietnamese law.  
The study covers the period from 2000Q1 to 2015Q4 and most of the data used in this 
study came from the International Financial Statistics, while some of them were collected 
from the General Statistics Office of Vietnam, and the Bloomberg.  The definitions and 
descriptions of variables used in this study are indicated in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2, 
respectively.  
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Table 3.1: Definitions and sources of variables 
Variable Definition 
Source Expected 
sign 
CPI 
Consumer price index 
(2005=100) 
IFS  
INEX 
The ratio of internal debt to 
external debt 
Author’s calculation based on the 
data from Bloomberg, Joint External 
Debt Hub Database-WB 
(+) 
CREDIT 
Growth rate of credit to 
private sector  
IFS (+) 
DEFICIT 
The ratio of budget deficit to 
GDP 
Monthly statistical data of GSO  (+) 
RATE 
Average bank’s lending rate 
to private sector customers 
IFS (-) 
 
Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Std.Dev Minimum Maximum No of Obs 
CPI 87.428 36.059 47.595 145.503 64 
INEX 43.932 35.258 0.110 118.368 64 
CREDIT 6.073 3.438 -1.104 17.554 64 
DEFICIT -4.282 2.772 -10.971 6.210 64 
RATE 11.076 2.701 7.05 20.1 64 
 
3.4.2 Estimation Model 
Based on the approach model suggested by Nastansky et al (2014), who analyzed 
the relationship between public debt and inflation in case of Germany by using liner 
regression in which inflation is seen as a function of public debt and other 
macroeconomic variables such as long-term interest rate and broad money (M3), the 
function ascertaining the impact of internal-external debt ratio on the consumer price 
index in case of Vietnam is estimated as follows: 
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!"#3;& = 	C + );"-=& + 	G#8-$;/& + ]	$-?;#;/& + d82/-& + A&																 (1) 
Where: #3;&	 is the consumer price index at time t ;"-=&  is the ratio of internal to external debt at time t #8-$;/& is the growth rate of bank’s credit to private sector at time t $-?;#;/& is the ratio of government’s budget deficit at time t 82/-& is bank’s lending interest rate to private sector at time t 
Nastansky et al (2014) estimated the relationship between variables by using a 
Vector Error Correction Model, which considers all variables as endogenous variables.  
The model in this paper uses five potentially endogenous variables including LNCPI, 
INEX, CREDIT, DEFICIT and RATE. To explore the effectiveness of monetary policy in 
controlling inflation, the growth rate of credit to private sector (CREDIT) variable will be 
added to the model, instead of the broad money (M3). This is due to the fact local banks 
are the major holder of government bond and the main instrument of monetary policy in 
Vietnam during the estimated period is to control the growth rate of bank credit and also 
local banks are the major holders of domestic government debt. In addition, in order to 
understand how fiscal policy stance with respect to domestic borrowing affects inflation, 
this paper will include the variable of budget deficit to GDP (DEFICIT). 
3.5  EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
3.5.1  Unit Root Test 
In time series analysis, it is important to test for unit roots to avoid spurious 
relationships (Engle and Granger, 1987).  This study employs Augmented Dickey Fuller 
(ADF) and Phillips-Perron unit root tests to investigate the integration order of the 
variables. The results of unit root test are indicated in Table 3.3. 
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Table 3.3: Unit Root Test 
Variables 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) Phillips- Perron (PP) 
Level First 
difference  
Integration 
order 
Level First 
difference  
Integration 
order 
LNCPI -0.193 (2) -4.628*** (1) I(1) 0.233 -3.725*** I(1) 
INEX 1.338 (0) -8.282***(0) I(1) 1.599 -8.302*** I(1) 
CREDIT -0.616 (7) -4.271***(6) I(1) -1.300 -21.283*** I(1) 
DEFICIT -0.644(3) -8.396***(2) I(1) -1.738 -14.616*** I(1) 
RATE -0.696(2) -7.267***(1) I(1) -1.857 -5.109*** I(1) 
Note: Lags based on Akaike Information Criterion are given on parentheses.  ***, **, * 
denotes statistic significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The null hypothesis 
of the ADF test and PP test is that variable has a unit root 
 
The results of Unit root test indicate that all variables in the study are integrated of 
order one. Therefore, this study will apply Johansen Cointegration and Vector Error 
Correction Model (VECM) technique to estimate the impacts of domestic debt on 
economic growth in case of Vietnam 
3.5.2. Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) 
Lag Length Selection Criterion 
To choose the set of variables to be used in the VECM, it is crucial to determine 
the optimal lag number. The results of Lag length selection test are presented in Table 3.4.  
All criterions including Akaike information criterion, Schwarz information criterion and 
Hannan-Quinn information criterion produces optimal lag 4. Furthermore, because of the 
use of quarterly data and short-sample period; the maximum lag length of the VECM 
hence is limited to 4. 
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Table 3.4: Lag length selection test 
Lag Final prediction 
error (FPE) 
Akaike information 
criterion (AIC) 
Schwarz information 
criterion (SC) 
Hannan-Quinn information 
criterion (HQ) 
0 59.571 18.276 18.451 18.344 
1 0.005 8.945 9.992 9.354 
2 0.004 8.517 10.437 9.268 
3 0.003 8.302 11.094 9.393 
4 0.0004*  6.273*            9.937* 7.706* 
Note: * indicates lag order selected by the criterion 
This paper uses the Trace Cointegration test to identify the cointegration rank and 
follows the Pantula Principle (Pantula, 1989) to decide the relevant specification of the 
model in regard to the deterministic components (constant term and time trend). The 
procedure of this Principle starts with testing the null hypothesis of non-cointegration 
vector, r = 0 for the most restricted model, if the null hypothesis is rejected, the procedure 
will move to a less restrictive model. If the null hypothesis of non-cointegration is 
rejected for the most unrestricted model, the procedure will continue with the null 
hypothesis of at most one cointerating vector for the most restricted model and so on. The 
procedure will stop only until the preferred model is selected when the hypothesis is not 
rejected for the first time. 
Table 3.5: Johansen Trace Cointegration test (4 lags) 
 
Model 1: Intercept but no trend in the cointegration equation and in VAR 
Null hypothesis Trace Statistic Critical value (5%) Eigenvalue 
None 80.274 68.52 - 
At most 1 46.603* 47.21 0.429 
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Model 2: Linear trend in the cointegration equation and an intercept in VAR 
Null hypothesis Trace statistic Critical value (5%) Eigenvalue 
None 105.965 87.31 - 
At most 1 64.277 62.99 0.501 
At most 2 42.156* 42.44 0.308 
 
The results for Johansen Cointegration test in Table 3.5 indicate the presence of at 
least one cointegrated equation in model 1 and two cointegrated equations in model 2.  
The null hypothesis is not rejected for the first time in model 1. Subsequently, Model 1 
(an unrestricted intercept in the cointegrated VAR, but not a trend in the cointegrating 
relation) is selected based on the Pantula Principle. The result of the Trace test for model 
1 provides an evidence of one cointegrating relation among the time series variables such 
as LNCPI, INEX, CREDIT, DEFICIT and RATE. 
Long-run Cointegrating Equation for Consumer Price Index is as follows: 
 
LNCPI = 0.49 +0.03INEX + 0.751CREDIT + 0.055DEFICIT  - 0.259RATE              (2) 
                           (0.001**)         (0.127***)            (0.148**)           (0.014*)         
 
Note: Standard errors of the coefficients are in the parentheses,  ***, **, * indicates the test 
statistics are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
 
As we can see in equation (2), domestic borrowing to finance budget imbalance 
has a significant positive effect on consumer price index in Vietnam in the long term. A 
1% increase in domestic debt (relative to external debt) leads to a 0.031% rise in the 
consumer price index. This can be explained due to the fact that through the open market 
operation, commercial banks – the largest holders of Vietnamese government bonds – 
have often used government bonds as collaterals to obtain funding from the State Bank 
and in exchange they pay rediscounted interest rate to the State Bank, which increases the 
money base in the economy, leading to a rise in money supply and thus results in higher 
inflation rate. On the supply side, domestic borrowing by the government through the 
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sales of bonds is mainly for the investment of public sector, which largely leads a rise in 
demand for goods, rather than creating additional output and consequently results in 
unavoidable increase in the price level.   
Larger budget deficit also contributes to higher price level in the long run. 
Specifically, a 1% expansion in budget deficit is correlated with a 0.055% increase in the 
consumer price index. Monetary policy variables, including the growth rate of credit to 
the rest of the economy and bank’s lending rate, are found to significantly affect 
consumer prices, with expected sign. A 1% increase in the growth rate of bank credit 
causes consumer prices to increase by 0.751%, while a 1% higher in bank’s lending rate 
results in a decline of 0.259% in price level. This provides evidence that inflation in 
Vietnam from 2000 to 2015 is not only a monetary phenomenon, but also a fiscal 
phenomenon in the long run, although the quantity of fiscal effect (domestic debt and 
budget deficit) is relative low in comparison to that of monetary effect (bank credit and 
lending rate).  
Table 3.6 presents the result of Granger Causality test based on the VECM. The 
coefficient of error correction term (-0.057) in the equation of consumer price index is 
negative and statistically significant at 1% level, this shows that the deviation from short-
run to long-run are corrected by 5.7% per quarter. In short term, only fiscal deficit and the 
growth rate of bank credit significantly cause the change in the consumer price index 
based on the Granger causality test results. Furthermore, the causality running from 
budget deficit to price level is significant at 5% level, while the causality from bank’s 
credit is found to be significant only at 10% level. This suggests that the immediate effect 
of fiscal policy on the price level is stronger than that of monetary policy in Vietnam 
between 2000 and 2015. The test results also confirm a one-way causality from budget 
deficit to bank credit and from budget deficit to the bank’s lending interest rate, indicating 
that the monetary policy in Vietnam is likely to change in response to fiscal policy, or that 
is to say there is a presence of fiscal dominance in the economy of Vietnam during the 
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time spans.  This, in addition, suggests that larger deficit, caused directly by higher 
government spending, results in an increase in the aggregate demand in the short run, 
which in turn fuels inflation. There is also a reverse causality from the price index to 
budget deficit, unidirectional causality from budget deficit to the ratio of internal-external 
debt and from bank’s lending rate to the internal-external debt ratio, meaning that the 
source of financing (between domestic and external source) is affected quickly by the 
changes in lending interest rate and budget balance.  
Table 3.6: Granger Causality Test based on VECM model 
Dependent 
variables 
Independent Variables 
χ2— statistics of lagged first differenced term ECM (-1) 
ΔLNCPI ΔINEX ΔCREDIT ΔDEFICIT ΔRATE 
ΔLNCPI - 6.257 
(0.181) 
8.869* 
(0.064) 
10.382** 
(0.035) 
1.279 
(0.865) 
-0.057*** 
(0.000) 
ΔINEX 3.918 
(0.417) 
- 7.230 
(0.124) 
14.295*** 
(0.006) 
13.671*** 
(0.008) 
18.041** 
(0.015) 
ΔCREDIT 5.361 
(0.252) 
5.117 
(0.275) 
- 18.690*** 
(0.001) 
0.701 
(0.951) 
-0.475*** 
(0.000) 
ΔDEFICIT 8.849* 
(0.065) 
1.133 
(0.889) 
3.715 
(0.446) 
- 4.585 
(0.333) 
0.220 
(0.949) 
ΔRATE 13.947*** 
(0.007) 
2.103 
(0.717) 
12.059** 
(0.017) 
11.951** 
(0.018) 
- -3.603*** 
(0.001) 
Note: ***, **, * indicates the test statistics are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. P-values are in the brackets. 
 
3.5.3       Diagnostic tests 
The results of the diagnostic tests to check validity of the model 
specification are summarized in Table 3.7. The test results for residual show that 
the residuals are serially uncorrelated, normally distributed and homoscedastic.  
Table 3.7: Diagnostic tests 
Test  P-value 
Lutkepohl Normality test 
     Ho: residuals are multivariate normal 
Jarque – Bera statistic  
= 2.959 
 
0.227 
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White heteroskedasticity Test 
     Ho: No cross terms 
Chi-square 
= 39.708 
 
0.572 
 
Breusch – Godfrey Serial Correlation LM test  
Lags LM-statistic P-value 
1 25.819 0.417 
2 27.302 0.341 
3 37.076 0.057 
4 30.835 0.195 
Note: Null hypothesis of the LM test is that there is no serial correlation 
 
3.5.4    The impulse response analysis 
In order to analyze how consumer price level responds when there is a shock 
in control variables, the generalized impulse response analyzing using vector 
autoregressive (VAR) developed by Pesaran and Shin (1998) is applied. The main 
advantage of the generalized impulse responses analysis is that it is not affected by the 
ordering of variables.  
From the results of the impulse responses function presented in Figure 3.12, it 
can be seen that a domestic debt shock generates directly an increasing reaction on 
consumer price index. Similarly, the response of the price level shock to a fiscal 
deficit impulse is also positive, supporting the results of VECM estimation. 
Interestingly, from the result of the response of inflation to domestic borrowing 
(INEXRATIO), it can be seen that the response of inflation to the movement of 
domestic debt level shows a U-shape pattern, as the positive effect of domestic 
borrowing on inflation decreases from the third period to sixth period, but increase 
again from seventh period onwards. This means that inflation respond in a larger 
magnitude to the movement of domestic debt level in the long-term. This might be 
explained by the notion that the accumulated of expensive domestic debt cause 
inflation to increase through the mechanism of public investment and monetary base. 
However, since increasing reliance on domestic borrowing with higher cost of funding 
would cause a decrease in fiscal space and an increase in budget burden, the 
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government then might increase inflation to reduce the real value of its debt burden 
and consequently result in further increase in the price level. 
Figure 3.4: Generalized impulse response function 
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3.6      CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
This study empirically investigates the effect of domestic borrowing (relative to 
external borrowing) on the consumer price index and the implication of debt financing in 
Vietnam over the period from 2000Q1 to 2015Q4 by applying a Vector Error Correction 
Model.  The estimated results indicate that higher consumer price index is accompanied 
by both fiscal and monetary expansions in Vietnam in long run during the study period, 
although the effect of fiscal actions is lower than that of monetary actions. Specifically, 
greater reliance on internal source of financing and a further deterioration in the budget 
position leads to an increase in the price level. While credit channel (bank credit growth) 
and interest channel (lending interest rate) - as important channels of monetary 
transmission in the country in recent years - were also found to significantly influence the 
price level in long term. In particular, an increase in bank credit growth cause long-run 
consumer price to increase; and a rise in bank’ lending rate, on the other hand, leads to a 
decrease in the price index.  
In short run, the results of the Granger causality test confirms the presence of a bi-
directional causality between budget deficit and the price level and an unidirectional 
causality from bank credit growth to consumer price index. The test results also suggest 
that fiscal policy is likely to have stronger immediate effect on consumer price level than 
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monetary policy. Furthermore, budget deficit is found to Granger cause the change in 
bank credit growth and lending interest rate in short time, confirming the possibility of 
fiscal dominance in case of Vietnam.  
In general, the study provides evidence that an increase in internal debt relative to 
external debt is inflationary in Vietnam in long run, while deterioration in budget deficit 
is inflationary in the both short and long term. Domestic borrowing might affect long-
term inflation of Vietnam through its effects on aggregate demand and the production 
costs, resulting in both demand-pull inflation and cost-push inflation.  Indeed, during the 
period from 2011 to 2014, the incremental capital output ratio (ICOR) in Vietnam was 
6.92 (in which the ICOR in the state sector is two or three times higher than that in 
private sector and FDI sector) and the ratio of investment to GDP was 31.14%, 
significantly higher than those of other neighboring economies such as Malaysia, 
Myanmar, Philippines and even Cambodia (Figure 3.5). This means that the recent 
economic growth of the country has required a considerable amount of investment – 
financed largely through the sales of domestic debt- or that is to say in order to generate 
an additional unit of income, Vietnam has consumed more financial resources as 
compared to other Asian economies which have similar stage of development. The high 
ICOR in Vietnam indicates the inefficiency of investment in the economy, particularly 
the investment of the state sector, which is financed mainly through domestic borrowings, 
due to the wasteful use of financial resources, poor supervision and management in the 
allocation of debt funding, and the corruption. This in turn contributes to the increase in 
not only domestic consumption but also the higher production cost, leading the rise in 
inflation in long-term. 
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Figure 3.5: Incremental capital output ratio of Vietnam in comparison with other 
Asian countries (2011-2014) 
Source: World Bank 
Furthermore, a significant correlation between monetary expansion and consumer 
prices was found in Vietnam, but monetary policy is not a leading indicator of inflation in 
short time. This renders that in Vietnam, not only monetary policy but also fiscal policy 
play an important role in maintaining price stability. Besides that, since 2007, the 
economic policy of Vietnam has mainly focused on increasing aggregate demand to boost 
economic growth, leading to the situation that a large part of budget deficits is financed 
through the domestic borrowing from local banks, new money supply then will put more 
pressure on inflation and the State Bank will be unable to maintain the stability of 
consumer price immediately.   
From the policy perspective, the findings of this study highlight that greater 
central bank autonomy with a concentration on stabilizing inflation is an importance 
factor to reduce the potential effect of high budget deficit and domestic borrowing on 
inflation given that Vietnam cannot give up borrowing to finance its budget deficit and 
promote economic growth. Further research on the level of central bank independence 
and its relation with budget deficits and inflation should also be conducted in the context 
of Vietnam. 
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CHAPTER 4 
PUBLIC DEBT AND BANKS’ NON-PERFORMING LOANS IN VIETNAM 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the continuous rising of non-performing loans (NPLs) has turned 
to be a major issue of concern for the global economy, especially since the start of 
financial crisis in 2008.  It is mostly due to the fact that non-performing loan plays an 
important role in measuring the health and soundness of banking system as well as in 
predicting financial crisis (Caprio and Klingebiel, 1996; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). 
The crisis in East Asia, especially in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and South Korea in 
1997-1998 offered a powerful evidence that financial crisis were preceded by huge 
amount of bad debts. Before the crisis, domestic banks in those countries were poorly 
capitalized, weakly managed and running high level of non-performing loans. The main 
indicator, total non-performing loans as percentage of total loans was about 50.1% in 
Thailand, 25% in Indonesia, 14.6% in Malaysia, and 7.4% in South Korea (Takayasu and 
Yokoe, 1999). Holding large quantity of NPLs, many financial institutions in those 
economies quickly experienced erosion in their profits and even some of them went to 
bankrupt during the crisis. The banking sector, in turn, faced serious risk of systemic 
failure.  
In the Europe, since the onset of the recent crisis, the average rate of NPLs as a 
percentage of GDP went up from just above 3% in 2007 to more than 11% in 2011, 
before declining to 9 percent in 2014 (Global Financial Stability Reports).  The high 
amount of NPLs has made European banks more vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks. 
Besides that, the negative feedback effects from banking sector to the real economy could 
place a drag on economic recovery and generate further damage. Taking into 
consideration the gravity of the situation, Governments in these countries have addressed 
the urgent resolution of the high NPLs problem as a top priority (European Bank 
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Coordination Vienna Initiative, 2012)19.  In addition to that, the increase in the stock of 
non-performing loans following the sovereign debt crisis in Eurozone has formed a 
starting point for policy makers and researcher to identify the linkage between 
government debt and bank’s non-performing loans. As pointed out in the research of 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), who examined the spillover effect from public debt crisis on 
banking crisis in 70 economies over a period of 2 centuries, much of banking crisis 
occurred during the period of public debt crisis. 
Mired in the fallout from the unprecedented global economic crisis since 2008, the 
economy of Vietnam is now under severe pressure and threatened by aggressive level of 
risk related to large public debts and huge amount of non-performing loans in the banking 
system. According to the new calculation implemented by the Ministry of Planning and 
Investment, the total public debt as percentage of GDP was 66.4% in 2014, exceeding the 
65% threshold set by the National Assembly. In addition to that, by December 2012, 
4.05% of total loans issued by the banking system were classed as non-performing loans 
(State Bank of Vietnam)20 and this reported level is far below the number reported by 
international rating agencies such as Moody and Fitch Ratings21.  
As the problem of NPLs threatens the sustainability of country’s economy, the 
government of Vietnam has took certain actions to resolve the case, including issuing a 5-
year financial restructuring plan and setting up Vietnamese Asset Management 
Corporation (VAMC). However, despite the government involvement, domestic banks 
are still in poor condition ridden by large amount of NPLs. In 2014, after 2 years of 																																																								
19 European Bank Coordination “Vienna” Initiative, Working Group on NPLs in Central, 
Eastern and Southeastern Europe, March 2012, IMF.  
20 The calculation of non-performing loans in Vietnamese banks does not conform to the 
international standards since it is based on 90 days overdue loans without considering 
repayment ability of the borrowers, collateral coverage and other factors (Point 6 of 
Article 2 of Chapter 1 and Point 1 of Article 6 of Chapter 2 of Decision No 
493/2005/QD-NHNN dated April 22, 2005 on the classification of debts issued by the 
State bank of Vietnam) 
21 According to the Fitch Ratings, the ratio of non-performing loans in Vietnamese banks 
in September 2012 was about 15 percent.		
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implementing the restructuring plan and more than 1 year since the VAMC was 
established, the overall ratio of NPLs in the Vietnam banking sector reached a new high 
of 4.83% for the first time ever (SBV). This has then opened a debate among economists 
and the public on to what extent does the government of Vietnam properly acknowledge 
the roots of NPLs problem.  
Therefore, the aim of this study is to examine the effect of overall public debt22and 
bank’ bad debts and the determinants of non-performing loans in 32 Vietnamese banks 
from 2004 to 2014 by employing the dynamic system-GMM (Generalized Method of 
Moment) panel estimators developed Blundell and Bond (1998). Although there has been 
a number of works studying banking credit risk in case of Vietnam, however, this study is 
the first study investigating the sensitivity of non-performing loans to both macro- and 
microeconomic variables, with main concentration on the impact of high public debts. 
Apart from that, this paper may help policymakers to identify and frame the problem of 
NPLs and to design better reforming procedures.  
The structure of this study is as follows. Section 2 provides a brief introduction of 
the non-performing loans situation in Vietnamese banks.  Section 3 discusses a literature 
review about the determinants of non-performing loans. The data and Empirical 
methodology is presented in Section 4. Section 5 illustrates the empirical results. Finally, 
conclusions and policy implications are indicated in Section 6. 
4.2  NON-PERFORMING LOANS: THE SITUATION OF VIETNAM 
The banking sector of Vietnam is characterized as inefficient and constrained by under-
capitalization and weak banks’ balance sheet. The State-owned commercial banks 
(SOCBs) still dominate the market in terms of market share, total outstanding credit and 
deposits. According to the data of the State Bank of Vietnam, the SOCBs account for 																																																								
22 Unlike the two previous chapters which concentrate mainly on domestic debt, this chapter aims to 
determine the effect of total public debt of Vietnam (including external and domestic debt) due to the 
fact that debt owned by SOEs - largely come from external lenders- is not included into total public 
debt of the country and these enterprises also account for a significant part of local banks’ non-
performing loans. 
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about 44% of total banking assets in 2014 and approximately 45% of total credit market 
(Figure 4.1) 
Figure 4.1: Vietnam Banking Sector Loans by Institution Type (% of total) 
 
Source: State Bank of Vietnam 
In the mid and late 2000s, the Vietnamese banking system experienced 
overheating credit growth with an average annual increase of 40%. Beginning with 
Vietnam’s entry into the WTO, many new banks opened and a large amount of bank 
loans was being allocated to both the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private sectors. 
Indeed, the extraordinary upsurge of lending was mainly due to the government policy, 
which has been to use political influence over bank’s funding to ensure that financial 
resources are allocated to priority industries and to consider SOEs as a pillar of the 
economy. According to the World Bank data, about 40% of total country’s investment 
capital had been made to SOEs and some of 60% of bank credit was channeled to SOEs 
between 2004 and 2009 (Rovnick, 2012)23.  
However, SOEs in Vietnam are found to be operationally less effective, 
financially less secure and mixture of large-scale corruption.  According to the 
government statistics, the turnover to capital ratio of SOEs, on average, was only 1.1% in 
2009, while this ratio in all businesses was much higher at 21%.  These enterprises also 
																																																								
23 Rovnick ,N. (2012): Inside Vietnam’s hush-hush banking crisis 
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accounted for just 27% of GDP, 37% of profit before tax and 25% of total sales revenues. 
Once the global economic and financial crisis had exploded in 2008, as the national 
economy slowed down, the movement of SOEs into non-core markets, as encouraged by 
the government, failed completely. At the end of 2011, 13 state-run corporations incurred 
a huge loss of nearly VND 49 trillion (US 2.3 billion) and in the meanwhile, they poured 
a total sum of VND 23.7 trillion (contributing to 7% of total state-sector investment) in 
five unrelated sectors including banking, securities, real estate, investment funds and 
insurance24. 
Altogether, with a dramatic fall in housing prices in late 2010 and early 2011, 
many of bank loans turned to be non-performing, especially those made to unprofitable 
state-owned enterprises and real estate organizations. According to the State Bank of 
Vietnam (hereinafter referred to as SBV), the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans 
in banking market in 2011 was estimated around 3.4% in which nearly 70% of non-
performing debts came from SOEs (Figure 4.2). Furthermore, the level of overall banking 
non-performing loans of Vietnam has been one of the Asia’ highest ratio (Figure 4.3). 
However, this reported non-performing loans ratio was believed not to fully reflect the 
true troubled situation of the Vietnam’s banking sector and far lower than the number of 
13% estimated by International Rating Agencies (Figure 4.4).  
Figure 4.2: Official Non-performing loans ratio 
 
 																																																								
24 State-owned Enterprises reform in Vietnam, Ministry of Finance		
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Source: SBV’s official data 
 
Figure 4.3: NPL to Total loan ratio in comparison to other countries  
Source: World Bank 
 
Figure 4.4: The NPL ratio from different sources 
 
Source: SBV, Fitch Ratings 
 
Figure 4.5: The share of banks' loans in 2011 
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Source: SBV, 2011 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6:  The allocation of Non-performing loans in 2011 
 
Source: SBV, 2011 
 
With the growing issues in the banking industry from 2011, a five-year financial 
restructuring plan has been issued in 2012 in an attempt to strengthen banking system - 
which was saddled with bad debts, and improve the market discipline. According to the 
plan, domestic commercial banks were classified into three groups with different level of 
risk: large and financially healthy banks, banks with temporary liquidity shortages, and 
sub-standard banks. Healthy credit institutions were instructed to enhance their 
competitiveness to become the pillars of the banking sector and to support credit 
institutions that lack liquidity or acquire less well-performing banks. Banks that lack 
liquidity were refinanced directly by the Central Bank to enhance their solvency and get 
back to normal. Sub-standard banks were given access to special loans from the State 
Bank and other banks but under the strict supervision of the State Bank, merged into 
others or, acquired by stronger healthy banks on a voluntary manner.  
In addition to that, the Vietnamese government also created a state-run debt 
management company called Vietnamese Asset Management Corporation (VAMC) in 
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2013 to handle the high level of NPLs. The main responsibilities of the company are 
purchasing bad loans from local banks and restructuring them. In exchange, domestic 
banks will be provided with special interest-free bonds issued by VAMC with duration of 
up to 5 years and a face value equal NPL’s book value.  These bonds can be repurchased 
(repo) at 70% of the net value with the SBV for liquidity.  
Since the creation of VAMC in 2013, about VND 243 trillion (US 10.6 billion) worth of 
bad debts has been acquired, meanwhile only VND 22.7 trillion in NPLs, or nearly 10% 
of total bad debt managed by VAMC have been restructured or sold. The maximum tenor 
of special VAMC bonds is only 5 years, meaning that after 5 years if VAMC cannot 
restructure the debts, they will be returned to the banking system. It, therefore, emerges 
clearly that VAMC only help Vietnamese banks to offload bad debts from their balance 
sheet and enhance liquidity for a limited time.  
Moreover, despite the implementation of banking restructuring plan and the 
operation of VAMC, the problem of non-performing loans still persist in the banking 
industry. As end of 2013, the overall level of NPLs declined slightly from 4.06% in 2012 
to 3.79%. However, this downward trend was reversed immediately in 2014, as NPL ratio 
increased back to a new highest level of 4.83% (SBV’s official data), approximately 
equals only one-third the percentage estimated by international rating agencies. 
As bad debts continue to accelerate in Vietnam, concerns have been raised 
regarding how VAMC can solve and restructure the debts and does the company fully 
help the banking market to handle the origin of non-performing loan problems. According 
to the FT Confidential Research25, the much-trumpeted decline of the official Vietnam’s 
NPLs rate in 2013 does not mean that bad debt has been resolved or paid off; it has 
simply been shifted from one balance sheet to another. Consequently, if the government 
does not appropriate take a tough stance to address this issue, the repeated emergence of 
non-performing loans will be inevitable and just a matter of time.  																																																								25	“Vietnam’s	troubled	banking	sector	–	no	easy	fix”.	FT	Confidential	Research,	2015	
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4.3  LITERATURE REVIEW 
There are two sets of influencing factors, which have been the subject of recent 
empirical studies on the determinants of non-performing loans, including bank-specific 
factors and macroeconomic factors. 
4.3.1 Bank-specific factors 
Cost inefficiency (as measured by cost to income ratio) 
Within the inefficiency literature, there have been several hypotheses that link 
bank’s credit quality with cost inefficiency, including “bad luck” hypothesis, “bad 
management” hypothesis and “skimping” hypothesis (Berger and DeYoung, 1997). 
Bad luck hypothesis predicts that non-performing loans and bank inefficiency are 
positively related.  That is, under adverse economic circumstances, which are beyond the 
control of banks, the amount of non-performing loans for banks is likely to increase. 
Banks, then, have to spend more resources to deal with failing loans and this, in turn, 
causes an increase in cost inefficiency.  
Similarly, the positive relationship between NPLs and cost inefficiency is also 
suggested by bad management hypothesis but with the opposite temporal ordering. Under 
this hypothesis, low level of bank efficiency increases the amount of non-performing 
loans after a lag. Given the argument that in poor managed banks, lower level of cost 
efficiency indicates lower quality of senior managers who have difficulties in controlling 
operating costs, monitoring loan portfolio as well as evaluating credit risk, the quality of 
bank credit then will be hampered by inadequate allocation of resources. 
In contrast, the skimping hypothesis assumes the reverse connection between 
NPLs and cost inefficiency. Under the skimping hypothesis, the amount of financial 
resources allocated to monitor credit risk affects both the level of risky loans and cost 
inefficiency. There always exists a trade-off between short-term operating costs and long-
term bad loans. Banks may devote fewer resources to loan portfolio management, even if 
this causes a higher volume of non-performing loans in the future. As a result, banks 
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appear to be cost efficient in the short run, but there will be a growing amount of non-
performing loans in the long-term. Thus, under skimping hypothesis, low cost 
inefficiency may escalate the level of non-performing loans. 
Hypothesis 12: Higher cost to income ratio is associated with lower level of 
bank’s non-performing loans. 
Bank’s size effect 
Salas and Saurina (2002) estimate dynamic panel GMM model and find an 
evidence of negative correlation between bank’s size and NPLs in Spanish commercial 
and savings banks from 1985 to 1997. The authors explain that large banks are likely to 
hold relatively less risky portfolios since they tend to be more diversified in lending 
activities than the small ones. This finding is consistent with the studies of Hu, Li and 
Chiu (2004) who have shown that the level of non-performing loans in Taiwanese 
commercial banks from 1996 to 1999 decrease as the government ownership in domestic 
banks increases based on the results of both random-effects and fixed-effects model. On 
the opposite direction, Stern and Feldman (2004) argue that large banks, that have 
government backing in case of losses due to too big to fail policies, may have incentives 
to take on excessive risk and this may results in the growth of NPLs. 
In Vietnam, Government intervention in banks’ credit decision-making through 
directed lending to failing SOEs has decreased in recent years but still persist. The four 
largest State-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) somewhat rely on political connections 
in determining loan access and are encouraged to provide large lending to state-
dominated and favored industries. The traditional customers of the SOCBs are SOEs, 
while Join-stock commercial banks give more emphasis to Small and Medium Enterprises. 
In the meantime, big banks in Vietnam also have government supports in case of 
difficulties due to its’ systemically important and quasi-policy roles in domestic economy. 
Consequently, the overall impact of bank’s size on non-performing loans in Vietnamese 
banks is expected to be ambiguous. 
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Hypothesis 13: Bank with larger size tends to incur lower non-performing debts 
due to government’s financial supports. 
Return on Asset 
Return on Asset measures performance efficiency of a bank in generating profits 
from total assets and the higher ratio of ROA, the better management is in utilizing bank’s 
asset base. The existing studies have found contradictory evidence on the effect of bank’s 
profitability on NPLs ratio.  
Boudriga et al (2009) in the study of 46 commercial banks from 12 Middle East 
and North Africa countries between 2002-2006 using a random-effects panel model and 
Selma and Jouini (2013) in case of 85 banks in Italy, Greece and Spain from 2004 to 2008 
through the application of fixed-effects method, find that bank’s earnings and NPLs ratio 
are negatively correlated. One possible explanation for this relationship is that 
profitability deterioration may induce banks to take riskier portfolio strategy, resulting in 
higher level of NPLs. Meanwhile, better performance in the past might reduce the 
pressure that banks are under to make higher profit and mitigate the exposure of banks to 
credit risk, which in turn will results in lower NPLs.   
In contrast, according to Rajan (1994), an increase in current profit may result in a 
growth in the level of NPLs in the future because bank’s managers may convince 
potential investors regarding profitability, financial position and future prospects of the 
economy; and uses a more lenient credit policy to keep income flowing, which leads to 
the current cost efficiency and future increase of NPLs. 
Hypothesis 14: Banks which have higher profit (i.e. higher return on asset ratio) 
have lower ratio of bad debts. 
4.3.2 Macroeconomic effects 
Economic growth  
Economic growth may have a negative relationship with the NPLs. This is mainly 
due to the fact that economic growth improves debt servicing capacity of the borrower, 
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consequently level of NPLs will decrease (Pestova and Mamonov ,2012; Klein, 2013; 
Salas and Saurina, 2002; Louzis, Vouldis and Metaxas, 2010;  Nkusu, 2011) 
Hypothesis 15: Economic growth leads to a decline in the level of non-performing 
loans of local banks. 
Public debt 
In recent years, there have been an increasing number of literatures on the 
relationship between sovereign debt and non-performing loans of banks. According to 
these studies, large public debt can lead to an increase in bad debts in the banking sector 
through two channels.  
The first channel is through the liquidity effects as indicated in the study of 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), who analyzed the link between public debt crisis and bank 
crisis by using a dataset of 70 economies spanning over 2 centuries and emphasized that 
in most cases acceleration in public debt is an antecedent to banking crises. The authors 
explained that public debt might decrease bank’s credit rating and increase bank’s 
funding costs. Operating under the pressure of liquidity, domestic banks have to limit 
their lending and as borrower cannot refinance their debts, non-performing loans might 
increase.  
The other channel is associated with the crowding out effects on government 
spending. Building on the theory of crowding out effects, Perotti (1996) argued that high 
level of public debt would force the government to pursue a strict fiscal policy to 
diminish its expenditures (wage and social benefits). As a result, borrowers’ income 
would decrease considerably, leading to the deterioration in their debt servicing ability 
and non-performing loans therefore might increase.  
Along with empirical studies, public debt crisis over a period from 1978 to 1998 
would fully support the linkage between banking crisis and debt crisis. Table 4.1 
classifies the 39 debt crisis episodes that happened between 1978 and 1998 into 4 groups. 
These are public debt crisis only, banking and currency crises both occurred during debt 
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crisis, banking crisis occurred during debt crisis, and finally currency crises started with 
debt crisis. Surprisingly, above 64 percent of sovereign crisis episodes experienced a 
banking crisis.  
Table 4.1: Incidence of Public Debt crisis 
 Public debt 
crisis only 
Debt, Banking 
and Currency 
crises 
Debt and 
Banking crises 
Debt and 
Currency 
crises 
Observations (total 
39) 3 19 25 30 
Percent - 48.7% 64.1% 76.9% 
Source: Bank of England26 
In Vietnam, during periods of public debt expansion, the government might limit 
their spending by reducing financial support (for example: loan guarantees, additional 
capital, and debt repayment extension or debt transfer) for SOEs. Given that about 60 
percent of bank loans is held by SOEs, which appear to be inefficient and poorly managed, 
the decline in financial assistance from the government would make loan repayment 
highly difficult.  
However, it should be noted that during economic downturn, Vietnamese banks 
have increased their holding of government debt (in form of sovereign bonds) to diversify 
overall portfolio and reduce risk. According to the Ministry of Finance, at the end of 2013, 
about VND 181 trillion (US$ 8.2 billion) of government domestic debt were mobilized in 
the primary market, more than double in comparison to 2011 (Figure 4.8). The debt 
market surged partly in response to the increasing demand from local banks, which hold 
nearly 90 percent of all government bonds. Given the weak economic environment and 
excessive accumulation of non-performing loans in the banking system in 2011, the State 
bank of Vietnam assigned credit growth limits of 12 percent to each local bank for the full 
year of 2013. Then, instead of lending, Vietnamese banks have turned to investing in 
government bonds, which are considered as very liquid assets. Investing in Government 																																																								26	Paoli et al (2009): “Output cost of sovereign crises: some empirical estimates”. Working paper 
No 362. Bank of England. 	
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debt with a constant flow of income would give banks less incentive to lend to risker 
projects and as a result, non-performing loans might be reduced. 
Hypothesis 16: The correlation between public debt and non-performing loans in 
Vietnam is positive.  
Figure 4.8: The value of Vietnamese Government bonds issued in Primary market 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance 
Credit to government and state-owned enterprises 
The link between bank’s credit and NPLs has been indicated in several existing 
studies. For example, Nkusu (2011) accesses the effects of macro-financial fluctuations 
on the ratio of NPLs by using a panel vector autoregressive model for a sample of 26 
developed countries over the period from 1998 to 2009. The author finds that in economic 
booms, higher lending as a percent of GDP causes contemporaneous NPLs to decrease, 
but the magnitude of this effect is quite weak. Given the fact in economic fortunes, due to 
competitive pressure and optimism about the economic prospects, credit standards are 
being eased and debtors can easily apply for additional loans to refinance previous debts 
and therefore the likelihood that they would run into debt troubles might be diminished.  
In case of Central, Eastern and South Eastern Europe from 1998 to 2011, Klein 
(2011) show that an increase in the ratio of bank loans to assets positively links with 
growth in NPLs after a lag based on the results of the fixed effects and difference GMM 
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estimations. This is due to the fact that excessively high credit growth during economic 
upturns can be interpreted as indicative of inappropriate risk management and a loosening 
of lending standards and therefore it would have a lagged positive effect on NPLs.  This 
finding is in line with the results reported in Espinoza and Prasad (2010) for 80 Banks in 
the Gulf Cooperative Council region over the period from 1995 to 2008. Using a number 
of econometric estimations including OLS, fixed effects, difference GMM, system GMM 
and a panel VAR model, they discover that the second lag of loan growth reduce the 
borrower’s ability to repay a bank loan by increasing their debt burden and hence may 
lead to a higher NPLs ratio. 
In case of emerging economies between 1996 and 2010, De Bock and Demyanets 
(2012) apply a system GMM model and provide some evidence that the ratio of foreign 
portfolio and bank flows to GDP  - as an indicator of foreign funding for credit growth – 
has significant negative correlation with banks impaired loans, while the ratio of bank 
credit to private sector to GDP is weakly significant with a positive sign. 
Unlike previous studies, this paper uses the ratio of credit to government and 
State-owned Enterprises to GDP since these enterprises accounted for nearly 60% of total 
bank’s loans in 2011 and about 70% of bank’s non-performing loans belonged to them, 
while in other countries, especially in emerging European economies, high ratio of non-
performing loans comes from by Small and Medium Enterprises. 
Hypothesis 17An increase in credit to the state sector and SOEs raise the non-
performing loans of banks. 
Production inefficiency of SOEs  
Performance of SOEs is measured by the ratio of State budget-funded investment 
in SOEs to GDP of the SOEs. The higher the ratio of investment to GDP, the worse 
performance of the SOEs is. 
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The government of Vietnam has addressed the role of SOEs as a leading force of 
national economy. Since the beginning of 2000s, the degree of openness of the 
Vietnamese economy has increased significantly in terms of both trade and foreign capital 
flows. In order to compete with foreign counterparts, the government has encouraged 
SOEs to expand outside their core operating business into unrelated markets through 
preferential supports such as high proportion of state budget-funded investment, low-
interest and large bank loans. According to the statistic of the General Statistics Office 
(GSO), in 2012, SOEs contributed to more than 50% of total state budget-funded 
investment, while accounted for just about 30% of the country’s GDP and also the share 
of state-run company loans of total bank loans was about 60%.  
However, the leaders or managers of SOEs in Vietnam were appointed by 
political appointees and characterized as bureaucrats rather than entrepreneurs. Therefore, 
it will become increasingly obvious that the larger financial resources government pours 
into SOEs (whose directors are not experienced and qualified enough in handling and 
controlling such large amount of money), the higher losses occur. An interesting evidence 
for that point of view is $1.5 billion of wrongful spending made by SOEs and nearly $9 
billion of non-performing loans owned by SOEs (equals 70% of the country’s total bad 
debts) in 2012 (Government report, SBV). 
Hypothesis 18: Since the loans for state-run companies account for nearly 60% of 
total loans provided by all banks in Vietnam, higher production inefficiency of SOEs is 
associated with increased future NPLs. 
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Table 4.2: Previous studies on the determinants of NPLs 
Study Methodology Data sample Main Findings 
Atlunbas et al 
(2007) 
Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression (SUR) 
approach  
 
European banks, 
1992-2000 
Skimping hypothesis 
Berger and 
DeYoung (1997) 
Panel Granger 
causality framework 
US commercial banks, 
1985 - 1994 
Bad management, bad luck, moral hazad hypothesis 
De Bock and 
Demyanets (2012) 
System GMM model 25 Emerging 
economies, 1996-2010 
Credit to private sector (+), foreign portfolio and bank flows (-), term 
of trade growth (-),  US dollars per national currency (-) 
Espinoza and 
Prasad (2010)  
OLS, fixed effects, 
difference GMM, 
system GMM  
80 Banks in the Gulf 
Cooperative Council, 
1995 - 2008 
Second lag of credit growth (+) , non-oil GDP growth (-), VIX (+), 
first lag of cost to average asset ratio (+) 
Fiordelisi et al 
(2011)  
Panel Granger 
causality framework 
26 European Union 
countries, 1995-2007 
Bad management effect 
Klein (2013) Panel VAR analysis CESEE countries, 
1998-2011 
Change in credit to GDP ratio (-), GDP growth rate (-), unemployment 
rate (+), inflation rate (+) 
Kwan and 
Eisenbeis (1997) 
Simultaneous equation 
framework 
352 banking 
organizations in US, 
1986-1991 
Bad management hypothesis 
Louzis, Vouldis 
and Metaxas 
(2010) 
Baseline model 9 Greek commercial 
banks, Q12003-
Q32009 
Bad management, size effect hypothesis, GDP growth rate (-), 
Unemployment rate (+), Real interest rate on commercial loans (+)  
Mamonov (2012) One-step difference 
GMM procedure for 
500 banks in Russia 
(85-90% of total 
Bad management 
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dynamic panel data assets), 2004Q1-
2011Q2 
Makri, Tsagkanos 
and Bellas (2014) 
GMM difference 
estimation 
14 European 
countries, 2000-2008 
Public debt to GDP ratio (+), GDP growth rate (-), unemployment rate 
(+) 
Quagliariello 
(2007)  
 
GARCH model 900 intermediaries in 
Italy, 1990Q1-2005Q1 
Industrial production change (-), Inflation uncertainty  (-), share price 
change (-)  
 
Rossi, Schwaiger 
and Winkler 
(2005) 
Granger causality 
framework 
278 banks from 9 
transition economies, 
1995-2002 
Bad luck, skimping hypothesis, GDP growth rate (-), volatility of 
official exchange rate (+), real lending rate (+) 
Salas and Saurina 
(2002) 
Arellano-Bond (1988) 
model (dynamic panel 
model) 
Spanish commercial 
and saving banks, 
1985-1997 
Moral hazard, size effect hypothesis, GDP growth rate (-), household 
debt to GDP (-) for saving banks, debt-equity ratio (+) for saving banks 
Williams (2004) Granger causality 
framework 
European savings 
banks, 1990-1998 
Bad management 
Vogiazas and 
Nikolaidou (2011) 
Least Squared 
regression 
Bulgarian economy, 
2001-2010 (monthly 
data) 
Unemployment (+), Loan growth (-), Third lag of Reall Effective 
Exchange rate (-), Global financial crisis (+) 
Vo, Le and 
Ho(2014) 
Panel regression model 8 listed banks in 
Vietnam (50% of total 
assets), 2008Q4-
2013Q2 
GDP growth rate (-), lending rate (+) 
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4.4 DATA AND EMPIRICAL APPROACH  
4.4.1 Data 
This study will use a panel dataset of 32 Vietnamese banks, including 4 State-
owned banks and 28 joint stock commercial banks over the period from 2004 to 2014. 
The list and description of variables used are indicated in Table 4.3 and Table 4.4. 
Table 4.3: List of sampled banks 
  No Name of Bank Bank type Data period 
1 VietinBank SOCBs 2004-2014 
2 VietcomBank SOCBs 2004-2014 
3 
Bank of Investment and Development of 
Vietnam  SOCBs 2004-2014 
4 AgriBank SOCBs 2004-2014 
5 Military Bank JSCBs 2004-2014 
6 SacomBank JSCBs 2004-2014 
7 Saigon-Hanoi Bank JSCBs 2006-2014 
8 Asia Commercial Bank JSCBs 2004-2014 
9 TechcomBank JSCBs 2004-2014 
10 EximBank JSCBs 2004-2014 
11 Vietnam Prosperity Bank JSCBs 2004-2014 
12 Saigon Commercial Bank JSCBs 2006-2010,2012-2014 
13 Housing Development Bank JSCBs 2006-2014 
14 DongA Bank JSCBs 2004-2014 
15 Vietnam International Bank JSCBs 2004-2014 
16 KienlongBank JSCBs 2004-2014 
17 MaritimeBank JSCBs 2006-2014 
18 SouthernBank JSCBs 2005-2013 
19 SeaBank JSCBs 2004-2014 
20 LienVietPost Bank JSCBs 2008-2014 
21 AnBinh Bank JSCBs 2009-2014 
22 OceanBank JSCBs 2008-2014 
23 Mekong Development Bank JSCBs 2008-2014 
24 Saigon Bank for Industry and Trade JSCBs 2008-2014 
25 Orient Commercial Bank JSCBs 2006-2014 
26 National Citizen Bank JSCBs 2005-2014 
27 NAM A Bank JSCBs 2004-2014 
28 Viet A Bank JSCBs 2004-2014 
29 PG Bank JSCBs 2006-2014 
30 WesternBank JSCBs 2004-2012 
31 Dai A Bank JSCBs 2007-2012 
32 Viet Capital Bank JSCBs 2006-2014 
Note: SOCBs refers to State-owned Commercial Banks, while JSCBs refers to Joint Stock 
Commercial Banks 
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Table 4.4: Definition of Variables 
Variables Definition  Source Expected sign 
NPL(-1) 
Lagged of the logit transformation 
of the non-performing loans to 
total loans ratio 
 Bank's annual 
report (+) 
DEBT Net public debt to GDP ratio  Ministry of Finance (+)/(-) 
INFSOE Inefficiency of State-owned Enterprises  
 Vietnam General 
Statistics Office (+) 
GDP The annual growth rate  WDI (-) 
CRESOE Credit to government and State-owned Enterprises to GDP 
 Global Financial 
Development (+)/(-) 
SIZE Bank's asset to total banking asset ratio 
 Bank's annual 
report (+) 
ROA Pre-tax profit to total asset ratio  Bank's annual report (-) 
COST Cost to income ratio  Bank's annual report (+)/(-) 
     
Dummy Variables    
YR2008 Dummy variable for year 2008 (Financial crisis) 
  (+) 
YR2011 Dummy variable for year 2011(Housing bubble burst) 
 
 (+) 
YR2013 Dummy variable for year 2013 (Creation of VAMC) 
  (-) 
 
4.4.2 Methodology 
Based on the existing literature, the empirical estimation of non-performing loans’ 
determinants is as followed: y"# = 	αy",#() +	βX",#() + θM#() +	δX",# + γM# +	12 + ρ" + 	ε"#	,					 α < 1,  
 
Where: 782 is the logit transformation of the NPLs ratio of bank i at time t, (i.e. log( 9:;<)(9:;<)) 78,2() is the lagged logit transformation of the NPLs ratio of bank i, X"# is a vector of bank-specific factors  X",#() is a vector of lagged bank-specific controls M# is a vector of macroeconomic variables M#() is a vector of lagged macroeconomic factors 
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12 is sets of time dummies ε"# is disturbance term ρ" is a bank effect 
When analysing the relationship between NPLs and macro- and micro-factors, 
several issues may arises such as: - Causality may run in both directions; - Possibility of autocorrelation between lagged dependent variable and the 
fixed effect which may result in dynamic panel bias; - Difference between T (time) and N (number of banks) dimensions in the 
dataset. There are more banks (N) than years (T). 
The OLS technique is not suitable for the estimation of a dynamic panel model 
because of strict exogeneity of the regressors assumption and the correlation between 
lagged dependent variable (78,2()	) and the disturbance term (ε"#	)		which may causes 
the OLS estimates to be biased and inconsistent. 
The system-generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators as extent 
developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) are the most appropriate amongst its 
counterparts to overcome the above problems by instrumenting the predetermined and 
endogenous variables with their own lags (Bond, 2002; Roodman, 2006; Sarafidis et 
al., 2006 and Baltagi, 2008).  The system-GMM estimators have one-step and two-
step variants. Although the two-step system GMM theoretically is considered more 
efficient than one-step estimates, there is some evidence that two step standard errors 
tend to be biased downwards in small samples while those for one-step counterpart 
are effectively unbiased (Arellano and Bond, 1991).  In addition, one of the main 
weaknesses of the system-GMM is the presence of too many instrument sets whose 
number increases quadratically with T. This potentially causes the two-step system 
GMM models less reliable for making inference. A large instrument count in system 
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GMM estimates is likely to overfit endogenous variables and weaken the correctness 
of estimation results (Roodman, 2008).  
Therefore, in what follows the study will employ one-step system GMM 
estimator with robust standard error and the collapsing method as suggested in 
Roodman (2009) to decrease the instrument count.  The lag range used in the 
instrument matrix is also restricted between lag 2 and lag 4 and in order to ensure that 
time specific effects do not drive the results; year dummies are included in the study 
as exogenous instruments.  
The validity of instruments is tested using the Hansen test of over-identifying 
restrictions (Arrelano and Bond, 1991). First-order and second-order serial correlation 
related to the estimated residuals in first differences is tested using AR(1) and AR(2) 
statistics. The system GMM estimator is consistent and efficient if there is no second-
order serial correlation in the residuals (AR(2) test) and the instrumental variables are 
valid (Hansen test).  
4.5 ESTIMATION RESULTS 
4.5.1 Summary statistics 
Table 4.5 shows the statistical summary of variables used in the study. Total 
number of observations for each variable is 310.   
Table 4.5 Descriptive statistics 
Variables Unit Obs Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
NPL % 310 2.22 1.88 0 15.7 
DEBT % 310 49.72 6.26 38.95 60.3 
INFSOE % 310 13.85 9.02 5.58 37.56 
GDP % 310 6.31 0.92 5.25 8.46 
CRESOE % 310 9.56 1.79 6.13 13.41 
SIZE % 310 3.54 5.32 0.02 29.57 
ROA % 310 1.29 0.85 0 5.96 
COST % 310 47.48 15.37 16.26 99.45 
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4.5.2 Correlation matrix 
Table 4.6 shows the correlation coefficients of the variables used in this study.  
From this result, it can be seen that the correlation coefficients between explanatory 
variables are relatively low except for the relationship between GDP and DEBT (-
0.52), GDP and CRESOE (-0.69), and ROA and COST (-0.61).  
Table 4.6 Correlation matrixes of key variables 
Variables NPL DEBT INFSOE GDP CRESOE SIZE ROA COST 
LNPL 1.00        
DEBT 0.26 1.00       
INFSOE -0.06 -0.14 1.00      
GDP -0.33 -0.52 -0.27 1.00     
CRESOE 0.34 0.66 -0.21 -0.69 1.00    
SIZE 0.16 -0.07 -0.002 0.04 -0.08 1.00   
ROA -0.29 -0.29 0.09 0.25 -0.38 -0.24 1.00  
COST 0.19 0.24 -0.06 -0.27 0.39 -0.03 -0.61 1.00 
 
4.5.3 Determinants of Non-performing loans 
The empirical results on the determinants of non-performing loans for the 
whole sample are indicated in Table 4.7 and for Joint Stock Commercial banks are in 
Table 4.8. The results for both all sample and sub-sample of JSCBs indicate that the 
Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions fails to reject the null-hypothesis that the 
instruments as a group are exogenous, meaning that there is no problem with the 
validity of instruments used in the estimations. The AR(1) test for autocorrelation of 
the residuals rejects the hypothesis that the errors are not auto- correlated in first order, 
while the AR(2) test cannot reject this hypothesis in the second order. Therefore, the 
system GMM estimators used in this study are consistent.  
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In general, macroeconomic factors appear to be important determinants of 
banks’ non-performing loans, while bank-specific indicators are shown to exert no 
significant impact on the quality of bank’s credit for the entire sample. Surprisingly, 
the creation of Debt Management Company (VAMC) – as proxied by YR2013 
variable - has been shown to not have any statistically significant effects on banks’ 
NPLs.  
The lagged non-performing loans have a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient (ranging from 0.46 to 0.93) across all estimated models. This indicates an 
evidence of high auto-correlation of NPLs as expected and the Vietnam’s banking 
sector is likely to be adversely affected (prolonged) by a shock to NPLs.  
Contrary to other previous studies mentioned above, government debt burden, 
as measured by the ratio of overall public debt to GDP, was found to be negatively 
correlated with contemporaneous non-performing loans, but positively correlated with 
future one. This might be explained by the fact that in Vietnam during weak economic 
conditions saddled with high stock of bad loans, an increase in government debt is 
associated with the rising demand for a safe investment instrument from local banks 
to remain their liquidity and profitability. Furthermore, given that Vietnam’s 
regulation on government public debt does not include the debt of the SOEs27, SOEs, 
as major customers of SOCBs, still receive strong financial support such as debt 
repayment extension or debt transfer from the government when they are run into 
troubles and all these supportive methods would be directly counted in the public debt. 
Or that is to say, the risky debt is simply transformed from SOEs to the government. 
Therefore, an increase in public debt would leads to a decrease in the current level of 
non-performing loans in banks.  																																																								27	According to the Article 1 of Chapter 1 of the Law on Public debt management No 
29/2009/QH12 issued by the Vietnam National Assembly in June 17th 2009, Vietnam 
public debt includes Government debt, Local government debt and Government 
guaranteed debt. 	
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The most vivid example would support this view is that in 2007, the overdue 
debts and non-performing debts at Vietnam Development Bank (VDB) reached a high 
level of 8.9%, but then quickly decreased to a lower value of 3.75% in 2009. This 
falling down of NPLs’ ratio was mostly due to a demand stimulus package of the 
Government which allowed VDB to raised their fund by issuing valuable papers and 
receiving ODA for lending and extending SOEs’ debt repayment (The Saigon Times 
Daily, 2012)28. Those are the loans that the Vietnamese government has guaranteed to 
repay to the creditors, or in other words they are public debts. As a result, the ratio of 
public debt to GDP of Vietnam rose significantly during that time from 45.6% in 
2007 to 49 % in 2009 (MOF).  
Nonetheless, to the extent that high level of public debt could crowd out 
government spending with an adverse consequence on the capacity to rollover bank 
loans of borrowers, specifically the SOEs, high public debt then would result in larger 
subsequent period’s NPLs.  Another explanation for positive relationship between the 
level of public debt and NPLs in the next period is that high public debt might cause 
sovereign credit rating to decrease and thus has adverse effect on bank’s credit rating 
and bank’s funding costs consequently might go up. Operating under the pressure of 
liquidity, domestic banks have to limit their lending and as borrower cannot refinance 
their debts, non-performing loans might increase 
The estimations also show that economic growth is negatively related to NPLs. 
This is consistent with previous findings, which suggest that economic growth 
enhances a borrower’s ability to repay their debt and as a result, NPLs will be reduced. 
However, unlike most of the previous literature, the effect of past economic growth 
on current NPLs is positive and significant. Perhaps because of higher GDP growth 
rate leading to increasing optimism about economic outlook, local banks in Vietnam 
are likely to boost their lending by relaxing credit standards on loans to gain market 																																																								28	“The National Assembly warns against SOE debts”. The Saigon Times, 2012. 	
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share and increase profit. This excessive lending can be a matter of poor and 
inefficient credit risk management, which causes NPLs to increase in the future. The 
results also suggest that economic growth only has a short-lived positive effect on the 
evolution of non-performing loans in Vietnam.  
As expected, the performance of SOEs (INFSOE) also contributes to the 
movement of NPLs in Vietnamese banks: the more inefficient a SOEs is, the more 
non-performing loans a bank has. Credit to SOEs and the government appears to have 
no effect on the level of bank’s non-performing loans. This might due to the fact that 
this variable cannot capture the exact amount of each bank’s loans located to the 
SOEs.  
The bank-level factors such as ROA, bank size and cost-to-income ratio were 
not found to have any significant influence on bank’s credit risk in all bank’s 
estimation.  
Table 4.7: Determinants of Non-performing loans (All Banks) 
Variables One-Step System GMM Two-Step System GMM  1 2 3 4 5 6 
NPL(-1) 0.577*** 0.457** 0.926** 0.623*** 0.582*** 0.912** 	 (0.001) (0.048) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) (0.020) DEBT -0.033** -0.041*  -0.031* -0.037*   	 (0.028) (0.069)  (0.079) (0.060)   DEBT(-1) 0.082*** 0.119**  0.076*** 0.100**   	 (0.000) (0.012)  (0.001) (0.011)   INFSOE(-1) 0.011**  0.029*** 0.010*   0.027*** 	 (0.010)  (0.002) (0.052)   (0.001) GDP   -0.523***     -0.468** 	   (0.003)     (0.016) GDP(-1)   0.280**     0.275** 	   (0.039)     (0.039) CRESOE(-1)  -0.039    -0.074   	  (0.434)    (0.221)   SIZE(-1) 0.015   0.015     	 (0.263)   (0.277)     ROA(-1) -0.171 -0.035 -0.359 -0.168 -0.029 -0.356 	 (0.253) (0.868) (0.221) (0.117) (0.829) (0.272) COST(-1)  0.010    0.133* -0.004 	  (0.372)    (0.077) (0.710) 
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YEAR2008 0.805*** 0.648** 0.853** 0.934*** 0.821*** 0.841** 	 (0.001) (0.044) (0.042) (0.001) (0.009) (0.020) YEAR2011  -0.335 0.606***   -0.175 0.596*** 	  (0.192) (0.000)   (0.458) (0.000) YEAR2013   -0.355     -0.289 	   (0.148)     (0.194) Cons -4.012*** -5.883** 1.492 -3.606*** -4.519** 1.053 
		 (0.002) (0.031) (0.202) (0.000) (0.023) (0.437) 
No.Obs 277 277 277 277 277 277 
No.Groups 32 32 32 32 32 32 
No.Instruments 22 23 24 22 23 24 
Overidentification tests: 
AR(1) p-value 0.015 0.004 0.035 0.005 0.014 0.047 
AR(2) p-value 0.112 0.179 0.504 0.236 0.2667 0.515 
Hansen test p-value 0.226 0.535 0.279 0.226 0.535 0.279 
Weak instrument robust test: 
Wald test p-value 0.000 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Confidence set for 
Wald test 
[-0.06, 
1.22] 
[-0.41, 
1.33] 
[-0.41, 
2.27] 
[-0.58, 
0.24] 
[-0.17, 
1.33] 
[-0.54, 
2.37] 
Note: ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively 
P-value in parentheses 
The AR(1) and AR(2) tests indicate the p-value for first and second order residual autocorrelation 
in first differenced equation 
The null hypothesis of Hansen test is the validity of the over-identifying restrictions 
The null hypothesis of Wald test that all parameters poorly identified is rejected given that 
identification of parameters in the IV estimation is assumed to be strong). The confidence intervals 
of the Wald test are wider than that derived from weak-instrument robust tests, meaning that 
instruments are strong. 
 
The estimated results for Joint Stock Commercial Banks are indicated in Table 
4.8, which shows that similar to the whole sample, only macroeconomic factors affect 
the bank’s credit quality.  
Staring with the macroeconomic effects, the results for JSCBs also indicate 
that higher public debt is associated with lower contemporaneous NPLs but higher 
NPLs in subsequent period. 
The quality of bank’s loans displays a similar pattern of behavior in response 
to the change in economic growth as in the investigation of the entire sample, 
although the explanatory power of lagged economic growth is less significant in sub-
analysis of JSCBs than in all banks’ estimations. This might indicate that during 
economic upturn, Joint Stock Commercial Banks tend to be more cautious when 
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making lending decisions than State-owned Commercial Banks because of having 
less favorable government treatments. The inefficiency of SOEs is found to positively 
affect the quality of bank loans and the magnitude of the estimated coefficient of this 
factor seems to remain unchanged in comparison to the whole sample. Based on the 
results of One-step system GMM estimations, bank-specific factors including bank’s 
size, bank profitability and cost inefficiency do not have any effects on the level of 
non-performing loans of banks. 
Table 4.8. Determinants of Non-performing loans (Joint Stock Commercial 
Banks) 
Variables One-Step System GMM Two-Step System GMM  1 2 3 4 5 6 
NPL(-1) 0.613*** 0.402* 0.842** 0.614*** 0.472** 0.773** 	 (0.002) (0.078) (0.012) (0.000) (0.046) (0.017) DEBT -0.037** -0.023  -0.037** -0.022   	 (0.017) (0.209)  (0.018) (0.323)   DEBT(-1) 0.090*** 0.107***  0.087*** 0.087***   	 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.003)   INFSOE(-1) 0.013***  0.030*** 0.012**   0.028** 	 (0.003)  (0.005) (0.010)   (0.023) GDP   -0.583***     -0.528** 	   (0.003)     (0.018) GDP(-1)   0.295     0.288* 	   (0.100)     (0.051) CRESOE(-1)  -0.032    -0.057   	  (0.647)    -0.443   SIZE(-1) -0.008   -0.092     	 (0.925)   (0.338)     ROA(-1) -0.175 0.059 -0.298 -0.179 0.033 -0.290 	 (0.276) (0.792) (0.345) (0.114) (0.847) (0.223) COST(-1)  0.014    0.016**   	  (0.199)    (0.045)   YEAR2008 0.928*** 0.816** 0.868** 0.905 0.988*** 0.892** 	 (0.001) (0.020) (0.063) (0.001) (0.002) (0.022) YEAR2011  -0.261 0.660***   -0.122 0.673*** 	  (0.177) (0.000)   (0.564) (0.000) YEAR2013   -0.336     -0.221 	   (0.198)     (0.424) Cons -4.005*** -6.963*** 1.203 -3.745*** -5.575*** 0.545 
		 (0.005) (0.009) (0.372) (0.000) (0.007) (0.609) 
No.Obs 277 277 277 277 277 277 
No.Groups 28 28 32 28 32 32 
No.Instruments 22 23 20 22 23 20 
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Overidentification tests: 
AR(1) p-value 0.018 0.018 0.045 0.010 0.014 0.035 
AR(2) p-value 0.062 0.151 0.434 0.138 0.2667 0.546 
Hansen test p-value 0.336 0.249 0.293 0.336 0.535 0.142 
Note: ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively 
P-value in parentheses 
The AR(1) and AR(2) tests indicate the p-value for first and second order residual autocorrelation 
in first differenced equation  
The null hypothsis of Hansen test is the validity of the over-idenfitying restrictions 	
4.5.4 Robustness check 
The robustness of the results has been examined by using Arellano-Bond two-
step system GMM estimator to re-investigate the determinants of bank’s impaired 
loans (shown in equations 4, 5 and 6 in both Table 4.7 and Table 4.8) or alternatively 
by changing control variables used in the equation. The results, which are indicated in 
both Table 4.7 and 4.8, show that there are no major changes in the signs as well as 
the significance of the correlation coefficients. This indicates that the results of this 
study are robust across different model specifications.  
4.6 CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This paper investigates the main determinants of NPLs over a period of 11 
years from 2004 to 2014 across 32 Vietnamese Banks by using one-step system 
GMM estimators. The main finding of this study is that macroeconomic factors 
contribute strongly to the evolution of NPLs of banks. In particular, in line with the 
previous studies, the results show that larger public debt leads to an increase in the 
level of NPLs in the subsequent periods and, as predicted, the ratio of NPLs is likely 
to rise when the operation of the State-run companies becomes inefficient.  
However, contrary to the results of the existing works which reveal that 
economic growth cause NPLs of banks to decrease by enhancing the capacity of 
borrowers to service their debt, the results in the sample of Vietnamese banks indicate 
that higher economic growth is associated with lower current NPLs, but higher future 
NPLs. This suggests that the short-lived impact of economic growth in mitigating the 
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problem of NPLs seems to be stronger through its effect on the expansion of bank 
credit, which increases the borrower’s ability to rollover their loans, rather than 
borrower’s effectiveness. As a consequence of over-lending led by less stringent 
credit appraisal during economic booms, investment portfolio of banks tends to be 
shifted toward riskier projects and thus results in higher NPLs in next periods.  
Regarding debt burden impact, this paper confirms a negative correlation 
between public debt and contemporaneous NPLs, suggesting that larger public debt is 
associated with lower current NPLs. Indeed, the decrease in the stock of current NPLs 
resulted from the increasing accumulation of public debt does not mean that the issue 
of NPLs faced by Vietnamese banks has been resolved properly, it is simply 
transferred from banks’ balance sheet to sovereign in form of public debt. Given that 
higher debt burden crowds out government spending, financial resources for 
supporting failing SOEs or banks will be reduced, causing NPLs to increase in the 
future. This study also finds that the quality of bank’s asset tends to be sensitive to the 
efficiency of the State-owned enterprises, as predicted. Higher inefficiency of SOEs, 
as measured by the ratio of State budget-funded investment in SOEs to SOE’s GDP, 
leads to higher NPLs, although the explanatory power is relatively low. The operation 
of VAMC - created by the government of Vietnam to handle the issue of large NPLs 
in banks – is shown to have a surprisingly insignificant effect on the evolution of 
NPLs.   
Finally, from a policy perspective, the findings of this study imply that the 
policy makers of Vietnam should strengthen banking supervision to prevent excessive 
lending in boom times and tighten banks’ credit standards. Furthermore, the 
intervention of government in bank’s lending decision should be eliminated to ensure 
the competitiveness of domestic banks. The calculation of public debt should also 
follow the international standards, which include the debts owed by State-owned 
Enterprises to propose better strategies of debt management.  Given the high level of 
 102 
banks’ NPLs in Vietnam strongly associated with the poor operation of SOEs, the 
Government of Vietnam needs to put the process of restructuring the SOEs in an 
urgent order.  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This thesis provides general understanding about the current situation of 
Vietnam’s public debt and its effects on both macroeconomic stability and financial 
market risk in a context of Vietnam’s economy. In general, the thesis investigates that 
greater reliance on domestic borrowing in the form of government bonds to fill the 
financial gap is one of the main contributors for the increasing solvency risk and 
economic instability in long term in Vietnam, while an increase in the overall level of 
public debt causes the ratio of non-performing loans in local banks to increase in the 
subsequent period.  From policy perspectives, the main findings of this thesis suggest 
that in order to avoid sovereign default, it is important to improve the country’s export 
base, the effectiveness of domestic debt management and to reduce the economic 
dependent on China by diversifying the country’s trading partners.  Moreover, the 
intervention of the Government on bank’s lending decision should be eliminated; the 
efficiency of public spending should also be enhanced, giving central bank more 
autonomy to limit the potential impact of high fiscal deficit and internal borrowing on 
inflation. In addition to that, the government should also enhance the supervision and 
management in using funds borrowed from internal resources, reduce spending on 
unproductive investments and encourage private sector to participate in public 
investment. 
However, this paper does have some limitations. Due to the availability of 
data, this dissertation is conducted for relatively short observation time spans and 
some of the data used is in the estimations collected from different secondary sources 
such as IMF, Bloomberg, CEIC and the World Bank. Therefore, further research with 
longer time period and higher quality of data should be implemented. The information 
on the level of credit to state-owned enterprises of specific banks is also needed. 
Moreover, since the issue of Central bank independence has been referred, the study 
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on the level of central bank independence and its relation with budget deficits and 
inflation should also be conducted in the context of Vietnam. Finally, the main 
purpose of increasing debt financing is to boost economic growth, hence there is a 
need for the study determining the effect of domestic debt on Vietnam’s economic 
growth. 
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